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This paper uses a new data set on domestic child adoption to document the preferences of 
potential adoptive parents over born and unborn babies relinquished for adoption by their 
birth mothers. We show that adoptive parents exhibit significant biases in favor of girls and 
against African-American babies. A non-African-American baby relinquished for adoption 
attracts the interest of potential adoptive parents with probability 11.5% if it is a girl and 7.9% 
if it is a boy. As for race, a non-African-American baby has a probability of attracting the 
interest of an adopting parent at least seven times as high as the corresponding probability for 
an African-American baby. In addition, we show that a child’s desirability in the adoption 
process depends significantly on time to birth (increasing over the pregnancy, but decreasing 
after birth) and on adoption costs. We also document the attitudes toward babies’ 
characteristics across different categories of adoptive parents – heterosexual and same-sex 
couples, as well as single women and foreign couples. Finally, we consider several recently 
discussed policies excluding same-sex and foreign couples from the adoption process. In our 
data, such policies would reduce the number of adopted babies by 6% and 33%, respectively. 
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1.1 Overview
Adoption is an important phenomenon in the U.S. According to the Census, about 1:6 million or
2:5% of all children in the U.S. in 2000 were adopted. Of these, 87% were U.S.-born and adopted
through the domestic adoption channel. In terms of revenues, the adoption industry is a substantial
one, generating approximately 2-3 billion dollars annually.1
In most cases, a successful domestic adoption is the result of a match between a birth mother
(BMO hereafter) who seeks to relinquish her child, and prospective adoptive parents (PAPs here-
after). The underlying matching process involves a bilateral search characterized by several layers
of mediation: Typically, adoption agencies represent BMOs, while PAPs work vis-à-vis adoption
agencies, lawyers, or facilitators. In this paper, we exploit the unique nature of a new data set
documenting the operations of an adoption facilitator. We analyze the preferences of PAPs over
the attributes of babies relinquished for adoption, the BMOs’ choices, and the factors that deter-
mine ultimate outcomes (i.e., a successful adoption, a decision to parent by the BMO, or the child’s
placement in foster care).
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a direct assessment of parents’
preferences over children’s attributes, in particular gender and race. These results feed into issues
of public concern, regarding the differential investment in children, and the impact of the advance-
ments in fertility treatments allowing for embryo selection. Unlike consumers’ preferences (that
are observable through market behavior) or preferences over marriage partners (that are revealed in
dating patterns),2 very little is known about parents’ preferences over children’s attributes.3 For the
speciﬁc case of adoptive children, our analysis is a step toward ﬁlling this gap.
Second, we analyze the determinants of successful adoption outcomes. In fact, children that
remain unmatched enter the foster-care system, which is notoriously detrimental to their short- and
long-term welfare.4 Despite the social value of a well-functioning matching process that delivers
suitable parents to every child, adoption has not received much attention by the economics litera-
ture.5 Our analysis of parents’ preferences, combined with the identiﬁcation of factors facilitating
an ultimate match, opens the door to policy interventions aimed at increasing the efﬁciency of this
process.
The third contribution of the paper is, in fact, the evaluation of several recently implemented or
suggested regulatory policies. Speciﬁcally, we assess the potential effects of a ban on adoption by
same-sex parents (implemented in several states) on the volume of successful adoptions. We also
1See the Census 2000 and Riben (2007).
2See the recent papers by Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006, 2008), Hitch, Hortacsu, and Ariely
(2009), and Lee (2009).
3Dahl and Moretti (2008) document a preferences for boys using indirect indicators of parents’ preferences.
4Nearly 40% of youth exiting foster-care are homeless within 18 months of discharge (U.S. General Accounting
Ofﬁce, 1999). Entry into foster care is also associated with a much higher rate of incarceration. For instance, in
California, 70% of all penitentiary inmates have spent time in the foster-care system (Select Committee Hearing of the
California Legislature, 2006).
5We discuss several exceptions in Section 1.2.
1illustrate the potential reduction in domestic adoptions due to the recent ratiﬁcation of the Hague
Convention in the U.S., which signiﬁcantly toughened intercountry adoption, starting in 2008.
We constructed our data set following the matching process managed online by an adoption fa-
cilitator between 2004 and 2009. The data set is comprised of approximately 800 cases of either born
or unborn babies that the facilitator collected from multiple agencies and posted on a website de-
signed for client PAPs. On the website, each baby is identiﬁed by a code, by an array of attributes, by
the estimated adoption ﬁnalization costs, and by a set of restrictions imposed by the BMO specify-
ing which categories of PAPs she considers acceptable (such as straight couples, single-sex couples,
single women, and foreign PAPs).
Each PAP pays a ﬁxed fee to the facilitator to enter this matching process. PAPs who partici-
pate in the matching process observe the babies available for adoption sequentially and can express
interest in any baby by submitting an application to the BMO (as long as they meet the BMO’s
requirements). Our data records all the PAPs that apply for each baby, as well as each BMO’s ﬁnal
choice, be it selecting an applicant PAP, matching through channels other than the facilitator, or
deciding to parent the child.
Our analysis follows several steps. We start by studying how babies’ attributes help explain
the variance in the estimated adoption ﬁnalization costs that we observe on the website. Adoption
ﬁnalization costs consist of adoption-agency fees and BMOs’ expenses (the former often accounting
for over 80% of overall costs). We ﬁnd that costs respond in a signiﬁcant way to the race and gender
of the child. Indeed, the costs associated with an African-American child are $8;000 lower than
the ones associated to a Caucasian or Hispanic child, and the costs associated with girls are $2;000
higher than the ones associated with boys. Moreover, estimated costs exhibit strong time trends,
increasing from $20;500, on average, in 2004 to $32;000 on average in 2009, and, for unborn
babies, they depend negatively on the time to birth. These observations are suggestive of the limited
regulation the adoption industry is subject to: While costs associated with different races could
potentially be explained by considering BMOs’ expenses (that may be correlated with race through
geographical locations entailing different costs of living), the differences in costs associated with
gender and time to birth are harder to explain through BMOs’ expenses alone.
In order to elicit parents’ preferences directly from their behavior, we need to account for the
supply of babies of different attributes. To that effect, we utilize a decentralized search and matching
model à-la Burdett and Coles (1997) and Eeckhout (1999). We assume PAPs’ preferences depend on
the observable attributes of the children they are matched with, and BMOs’ preferences depend on
PAPs’ attributes. Participants on both sides of the market effectively solve an option value problem.
In equilibrium, a PAP applies for a baby if the utility associated with it exceeds a certain threshold,
and a BMO accepts a PAP’s application if a match with that PAP yields a utility exceeding her
own threshold. We use this characterization to estimate PAPs’ preferences over children’s attributes
(gender, race, and time to birth) and adoption ﬁnalization costs.
We show that PAPs exhibit a preference bias in favor of girls and against African-American
children. Speciﬁcally, if we consider a non-African-American baby, the probability that a given
PAP expresses interest in such a baby is 11:5% if the baby is a girl and 7:9% if the baby is a boy.
The effect of the estimated adoption cost on child desirability is signiﬁcant and negative. That is,
ceteris paribus, an increase in expected adoption costs lowers the desirability of a child. This allows
2us to convert the gender bias into dollars. We ﬁnd that the increase in desirability of a non-African-
American girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equivalent to a $16;000 decrease in
adoption ﬁnalization costs. We ﬁnd the same gender bias to be present for African-American babies.
In particular, the probability of eliciting interest from a PAP is 3:4% for an African-American girl
and 1:6% for an African-American boy.
With regard to race, most babies in our data are characterized by the composition of varying
percentages of three ethnicities: Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic. If we consider an
unborn baby of unknown gender, the probability that a given PAP expresses interest in the baby is
about 13% if the baby is non-African-American and 1:7% if the baby is African-American. Again,
converting the racial bias into dollars, we ﬁnd that the increase in desirability of a non-African-
American baby with respect to an African-American baby (both of unknown gender) is equivalent
to at least a $38;000 decrease in estimated adoption costs. A similar bias (appearing in varying
magnitudes) is present for babies of known gender (whether boys or girls). Interestingly, we do not
observe any bias against Hispanic babies, who represent a substantial fraction of the babies in our
data set.
It is interesting to contemplate what underlies these observed biases. Consider, ﬁrst, the gender
bias. The existing literature on parents’ preferences for the gender of their biological children has
invariably identiﬁed a preference for boys. This is believed to be the case both within the U.S. and
abroad (e.g., as manifested in the case of the missing women in China). However, our results on
gender preferences constitute a reversal of this evidence in the adoption environment. One possible
explanation is that PAPs fear dysfunctional social behavior in adopted children and perceive girls as
“less risky” than boys in that respect.6
Consider, now, the racial bias. Homophily, deﬁned as individuals’ preference for similarity, is
well-established in the sociological literature. In the adoption context, homophily can translate into
PAPs preferring adopted children that resemble them in looks, potentially wanting children who can
pass as their biological children. Given that the PAPs in our sample are predominantly Caucasian,
the desire for similarity is consistent with a preference for Caucasian babies. While we suspect that
this taste for similarity is at the root of some of the racial preferences we observe, it cannot fully
explain the preferences we document. Indeed, to the extent that Hispanic babies are more likely
to appear different from Caucasian PAPs relative to Caucasian babies, homophily would suggest a
(possibly weaker) bias against Hispanic babies as well. However, as highlighted above, we do not
observe such a bias.
We also estimate the extent to which PAPs’ preferences depend on their own characteristics. We
differentiate between PAPs according to whether they participate as a couple or as a single person,
their sexual orientation (heterosexual and same-sex couples), and their nationality (U.S. residents
and foreigners). The biases mentioned above hold true for all of these categories of PAPs. The
racial bias is stronger for same-sex couples and weaker for foreign PAPs. We also ﬁnd that a big
6The lifetime probabilities of incarceration for men and for women were estimated at 11:3% and 1:8%; respectively,
by the Department of Justice (see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm). Also, girls are less likely to develop
behavioral problems such as autism spectrum disorders (four times more prevalent in boys than in girls, according to the
Autism Society of America) or ADHD (diagnosed two to four times more frequently in boys; see Dulcan, 1997). These
facts can be regarded as support for the perceived higher risk boys entail.
3component of the gender bias originates from the preferences of same-sex PAPs.
Next, we quantify the variation of child desirability over the course of the BMO’s pregnancy
and after birth. The probability that a PAP is interested in an unborn baby monotonically increases
the closer the BMO is to delivery, with the probability of an application rising from 3:6% seven
months before birth to 8:6% a month before birth. This effect is presumably the outcome of two
countervailing forces. On the one hand, the earlier the match between the BMO and the PAP, the
closer the adoptive PAPs can monitor the BMO’s pre-natal care. On the other hand, BMOs are not
allowed to relinquish their parental rights until after birth. This implies that BMOs who are closer to
birth have less opportunities to change their minds regarding the adoption and, thus, the match has
a higher chance of being successful. Our results suggest that the latter effect dominates the former.
We also ﬁnd that the probability of a PAP applying for a baby drops substantially immediately
after birth. In terms of policy design, this highlights the importance of minimizing bureaucratic
obstacles that could disrupt an adoption plan that is in place at the time of birth.
Turning to the outcomes of the adoption process, we ﬁnd that a doubling in the desirability of
a child, as captured by the rate at which the child receives PAPs’ applications, raises the child’s
chances of ﬁnding a match from 67% to 71%. In addition, raising adoption ﬁnalization costs by
$10;000 increases the match rate from 67% to 79%. These observations suggest that investments
made by adoption agencies posting higher costs may have an important effect on the likelihood of
generating a successful match.
On the normative side, the question of which parents are legitimate prospective adoptive parents
(speciﬁcally, for the case of same-sex or single PAPs) is a topic of ongoing debate in the U.S. and
abroad. Internationally, The Hague Convention, originally crafted in 1993, regulates intercountry
adoption and was ratiﬁed in the U.S. on April 1, 2008. The Hague Convention has simultaneously
made international adoption far more difﬁcult for U.S. citizens (potentially increasing demand for
domestic adoption) and domestic adoption virtually impossible for foreign PAPs. Consequently, its
merits are highly debated on both the domestic and international fronts.
Our analysis sheds light on some of these debates. For example, focusing on the effects of
participation of same-sex couples, we perform a natural counterfactual experiment. We shut down
the possibility for same-sex PAPs to submit applications to BMOs and ask how a baby’s chance of
beingmatchedwithaPAPchanges. Theanswerisa6%decreaseintheprobabilityofbeingmatched.
We reach a similar conclusion when looking at whether adoption should be open to foreign PAPs.
If we ban foreign PAPs from our sample, we ﬁnd a sizable reduction of 33% in the chances that a
baby will ﬁnd a match.
1.2 Literature Review
Despite the scope of the adoption industry in terms of volume of children and annual revenues, as
well as the unique matching mechanisms it employs, adoption has, thus far, received little attention
in the economics literature.7 There are, however, a few important exceptions.
7See Fisher (2003) for an account of how adoption has also been overlooked by sociologists and social scientists
more generally.
4The paper that is closest to ours in terms of questions addressed is Bernal, Hu, Moriguchi, and
Nagypal (2007). This paper presents an historical analysis of domestic adoption, uncovering the
trends in different types of adoption: domestic and international, related and unrelated, as well as
standard adoption and foster care. On the individual level, the paper estimates the propensities
of PAPs to adopt and of BMOs to relinquish their child across time. These ﬁndings provide an
important springboard for our analysis, which takes PAPs’ and BMOs’ decisions to participate in
the adoption process as given and focuses on their behavior within that process.
From a policy perspective, Landes and Posner (1978) propose a strategy for amending the short-
age of babies relinquished for domestic adoption and the abundance of babies in foster care. They
suggest the opening of a market for babies that would allow for equilibrating monetary transfers
between PAPs and BMOs. The envisioned market would entail little governmental regulation and
would remove adoption agencies’ monopolistic power. Our analysis is useful in assessing this pro-
posal, in that it identiﬁes parents’ preferences that would feed into estimating efﬁciency and the
likelihood of entry to foster care in a fully decentralized mechanism as such.
Sacerdote (2002, 2007, 2009) makes use of adoption data to study questions regarding the im-
pacts of nature as opposed to nurture. In particular, he analyzes the long-term performance of
Korean-American adoptees who, as infants, were randomly assigned to families in the U.S. While
there exists a performance gap between biological and adopted children (favoring biological chil-
dren) in both education and income, there is no gap in the transmission of other habits (namely,
eating, drinking, and smoking). Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2006) also focus on the long term
effects on both education and income of Swedish adoptees. They show that the adoptive father’s in-
come is the most signiﬁcant determinant of the adoptee’s income, while the birth mother’s education
has the strongest effect on education performance.
The adoption industry has received attention in other disciplines, ranging from legal studies, to
sociology, psychology, and history. We provide a summary of the legal background of adoption in
Section 2 below. For detailed accounts of child adoption in the U.S., we refer the interested reader
to Melosh (2002), Pertman (2000), and references therein.
Other than the literature on adoption per se, our paper is linked to the work on two-sided match-
ing with frictions (e.g., Adachi, 2003; Burdett and Coles, 1997; Eeckhout, 1999; and Smith, 2006).
The underlying model in that literature has two sides of a market (e.g., workers and ﬁrms, men and
women, etc.) encountering each other randomly each period. During an encounter, the two par-
ties observe the utility the match would generate and jointly decide whether to pursue the match
and leave the market, or to separate and wait for future periods. Equilibrium behavior is generally
characterized by threshold strategies, where each participant agrees to a match with someone who
is “good enough” from the other side of the market.
From a methodological point of view, our paper uses the underlying search and matching model
to estimate parents’ preferences. We know of very few other empirical estimations of two-sided
matching with frictions (see Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos, 2009 and Botticini and Siow,
2008, Del Boca and Flinn, 2006, as well as some of the work on online dating discussed below).
The existing work focuses mainly on the marriage-market context. We note that the commitment
entailed in the successful conclusion of an adoption (that is arguably irreversible) makes our process
a particularly good ﬁt for this class of models.
5Gender and racial biases are both common and well documented in many realms of modern
society.8 Related to this paper, several recent papers have used matching environments of other
types, particularly the online dating market, to estimate racial preferences (e.g., Fisman, Iyengar,
Kamenica, and Simonson, 2006, 2008; and Hitch, Hortacsu, and Ariely, 2009). This work identi-
ﬁes a preference for same-race partners, much in the spirit of the racial preferences we observe.9
Technically, adoption through facilitators and online dating are similar in that both involve a two-
sided search. However, unlike most online dating markets, in which an outcome is an agreement
for a rather preliminary contact, outcomes in the adoption environment are effectively binary and
irreversible: A match means a likely successful adoption. In terms of gender preferences, there
is a large body of work suggesting preferences for sons in the U.S. (see Dahl and Moretti, 2008)
and abroad (for instance, the case of the missing women in Asia, as noted by Sen, 1990). Most of
this work uses indirect indicators (e.g., separation rates of couples as a function of their children’s
gender) to assess these biases. In this paper, we use the detailed matching data to estimate parents’
preferences over children’s attributes directly, and we identify a substantial preference for girls in
the adoption context.
2 Institutional Environment
2.1 The Adoption Process in the U.S.
Adoption is an ancient institution.10 The concept of adoption, however, was not legally recognized
in the United States until 1851, with the enactment of The Massachusetts Adoption of Children Act,
widely considered the ﬁrst “modern” adoption law. Prior to the 20th century, court adoptions were
very rare. During the 20th century, formal adoptions increased dramatically in the U.S., reaching a
numerical peak by 1970, when 175,000 adoptions were ﬁnalized. This increase went hand in hand
with a variety of reforms dedicated to the provision of adopted children with legal safeguards en-
forced by certiﬁed agencies. In 1917, Minnesota passed the ﬁrst state law that required children and
adults to be investigated and adoption records to be shielded from public view. By mid-century, vir-
tually all U.S. states had revised their laws to incorporate such minimum standards as pre-placement
investigations, post-placement probation, and sealed records of the adoption process. Since 1950, a
number of major shifts have occurred. First, the deﬁnition of adoptable children was expanded to in-
clude older, disabled, non-Caucasian, and special-needs children. Second, a variety of reforms have
been introduced to encourage open adoptions, which allow adoptees and birth parents to remain in
8There exists a large literature that corroborates gender and racial biases in the workplace (e.g., Altonji and Blank,
1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2008; and Flabbi, 2009), in the health system
(Cooper-Patrick, Gallo, Gonzales, Vu, Powe, Nelson, and Ford, 1999), in the education system (Fryer and Levitt 2006;
Skiba, Michael, Nardo and Peterson, 2004), and in the justice system (Mustard, 2001; Iyengar, 2007, 2008). For
overviews, see Loury (2002) and Nelson (2009).
9See also Banerjee, Duﬂo, Ghatak and Lafortune (2009) for an empirical analysis of the arranged marriage market
in India. They document strong preferences for within-caste marriages, similar to the preferences for same-race partners
unearthed by the online dating literature.
10Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and Babylonians, all had adoption systems.
6contact.
In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created The Uni-
form Adoption Act as an attempt to codify and make current legal practice uniform across states.
Nonetheless, very few states altered jurisdiction to incorporate the Uniform Adoption Act and states
still differ with respect to an assortment of details regarding the legal formalization of adopted kin-
ship. In what follows, we summarize the main elements of the adoption process in the U.S. (see
Jasper, 2008 or Mabrey, 2006 for a full state-by-state survey of adoption jurisdiction).
The supply side of domestic adoption is represented by a population of BMOs who intend to re-
linquish their children for adoption. The children can be either born or unborn. When not searching
for adoptive parents on her own, the BMO looks for (or is located by) an adoption agency or some
other organization in order to be matched with PAPs.11 Adoption agencies can be either private or
public. While public adoption agencies typically specialize in special-needs children, private agen-
cies match all types of children, and can be either non-proﬁt or for-proﬁt organizations, depending
on state law.12
The demand side of domestic adoption consists of PAPs. These PAPs can be either (straight or
same-sex) couples or singles, and either U.S. or foreign citizens. After undergoing a certiﬁcation
based on a home study, the ﬁrst choice that PAPs seeking to adopt face is whether to participate
in either the international or the domestic adoption process, or in both.13 The PAPs who decide
to search for a child domestically can use adoption agencies, pursue a private (or “independent”)
adoption with the aid of specialized attorneys, or advertise in local magazines and newsletters.
EachofthesechannelscanbeproblematicfromthePAPs’pointofview. Sinceadoptionagencies
often operate in geographical areas where they can easily locate BMOs, or where they are subject to
less regulation, it can be difﬁcult for PAPs (who usually reside in cities and high-income areas) to
locate, screen, and interact with many agencies at the same time. Moreover, in many states, the law
does not allow adoption attorneys to act as intermediaries in adoption matches. Finally, independent
search through advertising is time-consuming and may entail signiﬁcant cost uncertainty.
These considerations created a role for intermediaries, usually referred to as “adoption facilita-
tors.” Much like adoption agencies, the role of facilitators is regulated by state laws, and in some
states their activity is restricted.14 Often operating online, adoption facilitators connect with BMOs
from multiple agencies and coordinate the matching process with PAPs.
Once a PAP is matched with a child, the ensuing process depends on whether the child is born
or not. If the BMO of an already born child has not yet relinquished her parental rights to an agency,
then she can relinquish them as soon as the match occurs. The child is then put in the custody of the
11If the child is already born, the BMO can immediately relinquish her parental rights (legal custody of the child) to
the agency, and forego her participation in the selection of the adoptive parents.
12Some agencies are faith-based and give priority to families from a particular religious background.
13These two adoption routes entail several trade-offs. While costs are comparable, international adoption is subject to
the restrictions of the Hague Convention (see Section 2.3 below), as well as to the laws of the child’s country of origin.
Children adopted internationally are typically older than those adopted domestically, and the wait to adopt them has
been reported to be longer (see http://www.americanadoptions.com).
14In fact, only in very few states, such as California and Pennsylvania, can adoption facilitators be legally paid (see,
e.g., California Family Code Sections 8623-8638, Chapter 1.5).
7PAP. If, instead, the baby is unborn, the parties wait until birth, with no commitment to complete
the adoption on either side. During this time, the PAP normally pays the living and the medical
expenses of the BMO. At birth, with a lag determined by state law, the BMO can, if she still desires,
relinquish her parental rights. In this case, the child is placed in the custody of the PAP.
This initiates the post-placement process. The adoption is ﬁnalized when a court transfers the
parentalrightstothePAP.Theﬁnalizationisconditionalonaseriesoflegalrequirementsdetermined
by the state. The court bases its decision on a post-placement report completed by a registered social
worker on the basis of some visits to the adopting family. The court also screens the nature of the
ﬁnancial transfers that have taken place between the PAP and the BMO, as well as the transfers that
the PAP has made to the adoption agency. In particular, the court checks that transfers to the BMO
constitute allowed reimbursements of either living or medical expenses.15 Successful PAPs can then
ﬁle for an adoption tax credit that effectively reduces the cost of adoption by a ﬁxed amount.16
2.2 Gay, Lesbian, and Single Adoption
Adoption by gay and lesbian couples or individuals is legal in only a few countries around the
world.17 In the U.S., many states have enacted or attempted to enact legislation on gay and lesbian
adoption since the early 2000s. However, state laws are still largely silent on the issue. While some
states restrict adoption by sexual orientation or marital status, legislation with respect to this issue is
still in ﬂux, and gay and lesbian adoption is the subject of a very active and heated policy debate.
At the time of writing of this paper, only Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, and Utah imposed restrictions on gay and lesbian adoption.18 Nonetheless, in many states in
which statutes do not prohibit adoption by gay men and lesbians, individual judges or courts have
ruled against the practice. In fact, in 40 states, Statute or Appellate Court rulings have banned joint
adoption by same-sex couples.19
The Census 2000 indicated that 4% of all adopted children in the U.S. live in a gay or lesbian
household. Even though in 2000 the adoption rate of same-sex households was reported as 1:6%,
this rate has the potential to increase dramatically if the current restrictions are lifted.20
15Any transfer from the PAP to the BMO that is aimed to obtain consensus of the adoption is illegal. State laws
specify the precise categories of BMO expenses (such as medical, legal, and living costs) that can be covered by PAPs,
which are classiﬁed as charity. If the BMO changes her mind regarding the adoption before ﬁnalization, all transfers are
generally non-reimbursable.
16For 2008, the maximal adoption credit was $11,650; see IRS Form 8839, Qualiﬁed Adoption Expenses.
17Besides the U.S., these are Andorra, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Guam, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and two states in Australia.
18Arkansas and Utah, while not explicitely banning gay and lesbian adoption, prohibit adoption by a couple that is
not legally married. At the same time, in these states it is legal for single individuals to adopt, regardless of sexual
orientation, so long as they are not co-habitating in non-marital relationships. Historically, Florida has been the only
state that had explicitely banned adoption by a gay or lesbian single individual. This ban was ruled unconstitutional in
November 2008.
19For details regarding states’ jurisdiction on gay and lesbian adoption, see American Civil Liberties Foundation
(2006), Human Rights Campaign (2009), and National Conference of State Legislatures (2009).
20See Badget, Chambers, Gates, and Macomber (2007).
8Since the early 90s, there has been an increase in the number of adoptions by single individuals,
the vast majority of whom are women. By 2000, singles accounted for at least 15% of all adoptive
parents in the U.S. (see the Census 2000). While allowed in the U.S., adoption by local or foreign
single individuals is prohibited in the majority of countries all over the world.
2.3 The Hague Convention
Intercountry adoptions have played an important role over the years. The percentage of intercountry
adoptions (out of all adoptions) ﬂuctuated between 4% and 9% between the 80s and the mid 90s and
rose to a documented 15% in 2001 (see Bernal, Hu, Moriguchi, and Nagypal, 2007).
A critical development in international adoption law and practice was the enactment of the 1993
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
(hereafter, “The Hague Convention”).21 The Hague Convention was ratiﬁed in the U.S. on April
1, 2008, at which time 74 other nations had already signed, ratiﬁed, or acceded it. The primary
principlesofTheHagueConventionaretargetedatensuringthateachadoptionisinthebestinterests
of the child and at preventing the abduction, sale, or trafﬁcking of children between countries. Most
notably, the treaty requires that: (i) Agencies involved in intercountry adoption, in both the sending
and receiving country, be certiﬁed by government agencies; (ii) Agencies provide proof of effort
to place the child for adoption in their country of origin by advertising the case prior to matching
the child with foreign PAPs; and (iii) The baby remains in foster care in the country of origin for a
minimal amount of time before full custody is granted to the selected PAP. All expenses during the
time in foster care are paid for by the PAP.
There are two channels through which The Hague Convention may affect U.S. domestic adop-
tion. First, the high costs associated with agency certiﬁcation and advertising have reduced the
number of agencies, in both the U.S. and abroad, that can legally send foreign children to the U.S.
This can potentially increase both the costs and the waiting times to adopt a foreign child. As a
result, the demand for domestic babies is expected to increase.
Second, prior to the ratiﬁcation of The Hague Convention, foreign PAPs could adopt U.S.-born
babies in much the same way U.S. residents do. Since the adoption process in European countries
and Canada is often slower and more centralized than in the U.S., foreign PAPs constituted a non-
trivial portion of the demand for domestic children.22 The increased regulation due to The Hague
Convention is expected to dramatically slow down the adoption of U.S. children by foreign PAPs.23
Government agencies took notice of these problems and modiﬁed some regulatory aspects of the
The Hague Convention in March 2009.24
21The Hague Convention is available through http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=69
22For instance, data from the Canadian immigration bureau indicates that 399 American children aged 0 to 21 were
adopted by Canadian citizens between 1994 and 1998.
23Privateconsultationswithadoptionexpertssuggestedthat, asofApril2009(onefullyearaftertheHagueconvention
was ratiﬁed), only one foreign PAP completed an adoption process in the U.S. Unfortunately, there are very limited solid
data documenting adoption of U.S. children from abroad as there is no agency tracking issuance of U.S. passports to
infants, nor any organization tracking visa applications for U.S. infants moving abroad for adoptive placement.
24In particular, if the BMO herself identiﬁes a suitable foreign PAP, the agency’s burden to show effort in recruiting a
93 The Data
3.1 The Facilitator’s Operations
We constructed our data set monitoring an online adoption facilitator who mediates between agen-
cies dealing with BMOs and PAPs, over the period from June 2004 to August 2009.25 Over a ﬁve
year period, we collected data on the applications of 675 PAPs to more than 800 BMOs. The facili-
tator placed 115 babies, while 504 were placed through other channels.
New cases of unborn babies or already-born children available for adoption are posted on the
facilitator’spubliclyaccessiblewebsiteregularly.26 Activityonthewebsitefollowsthisbasictiming:
1. An unborn baby, or already-born child, is posted as a new case on the facilitator’s web-
site. The child is identiﬁed by the BMO’s code name.27 For every case, the facilitator publishes
the following information: (a) The baby’s characteristics: date on which the case is presented, race
composition, gender (when available), due date for unborn babies, and age for already-born chil-
dren;28 (b) the estimated costs of adopting the child. These include a ﬁxed facilitator fee, adoption
agency fees, BMO’s expenses (that may include living and medical costs), and legal fees; and (c)
the constraints that the BMO or the adoption agency impose on PAPs. Speciﬁcally, the BMO can
restrict the availability of her baby from same-sex, single, foreign PAPs, etc.29
2. After paying the ﬁxed fee to the facilitator, a PAP can submit one or more applications to
adopt any of the available children at no additional cost.30 As PAPs submit an application to a
BMO, their ﬁrst name (or initials) are posted on that child’s case. The PAPs’ application consists
of a letter to the BMO sent through the facilitator and the agency. In this letter, the PAPs describe
themselves, their life-style, and how they plan to raise the child.31
3. The posted cases can be resolved in several ways: (a) the BMO chooses the desired PAP
among the applicants.32 This results in a match observable on the website, and both the BMO and
U.S. citizen as PAP was lifted (see http://adoption.state.gov on 22 CFR 96.54(a)).
25See the Data Appendix for detailed information on the construction of the data set.
26On any given day, there are on average 23 BMOs on the website, all listed on the same page. This makes it
straightforward for PAPs to browse the entire list of available BMOs.
27The facilitator modiﬁes or changes the BMOs’ real ﬁrst names to maintain their anonymity.
28The website also reports fetus anomalies detected by an ultrasound or other documented health problems. However,
these medical issues occur for only 0:2% of the children in our data set.
29There are some additional restrictions on the PAPs’ characteristics dictated by state laws or special adoption regula-
tions that are relevant for some cases. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 gives Native American Indian
Nations and Tribes the right to control adoptions that involve their tribal members’s children. As a result, the adoption
of these children is often restricted to Native American PAPs only. In addition, the BMO can also express her preference
toward an open adoption. In our sample, in only 2% of cases did the BMO specify a preference regarding a closed as
opposed to an open adoption.
30In some cases, before applying, the PAPs receive additional information regarding the BMO and the child based on
an interview the agency conducts with the BMO. This interview comprises questions regarding the BMO’s health and
life-style, her family and the birth-father characteristics. While the information posted on the website is veriﬁable by
the agency and the facilitator, this additional information is not veriﬁable.
31The letter often includes photos of the PAPs, their family, and their environment. No other contact between BMO
and PAPs is permitted prior to a match.
32If the child is born and the BMO has already relinquished her parental rights, the adoption agency that has legal
10the PAP leave the website;33 (b) the BMO is matched through a different channel, and the child is
reported as “matched” on the website; (c) the BMO decides to parent, and the decision is reported
on the website; (d) the facilitator reports a lost contact with the BMO; or (e) there are no applications
for the case.34 This ﬁnal outcome sometimes leads the BMO to parent, but in most cases the child
remains unmatched. Unmatched children enter the foster-care system, where they remain adoptable
until the age of 18.
The entire process, from posting of a BMO on the website to ﬁnding a match with a PAP, is very
fast. Most PAP applications are submitted within the ﬁrst 10 days of posting a child, and the median
child is available on the website for less than a month.
3.2 Summary Statistics
3.2.1 Birth Mothers’ Statistics
Table 1, below, reports the summary statistics pertaining to children’s attributes in our data, while
the summary statistics conditional on a match and the time trends of some of the children’s attributes
appear in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, in the Appendix.35
The main categories of attributes that prove most useful for our analysis are: gender, race,
whether babies have already been born or are unborn, the time period between presentation date
and birth for unborn babies, adoption ﬁnalization costs, and the restrictions imposed by the BMOs
on the acceptable PAPs.
In terms of gender, not conditioning on the achievement of a match, 22:3% of the children in
our sample are girls, 30:6% are boys, and the rest are of unknown gender. Conditioning on a match
being created (either through the facilitator or through other channels), girls account for 28:8% of
matched children, while boys account for 24:2%.
As for race, the unconditional breakdown in our data set is 36:1% Caucasian, 38:9% African-
American, and 12:8% Hispanic. The race breakdown conditional on children ﬁnding a match is
37:5% Caucasian, 38:7% African-American, and 14:3% Hispanic.36
Already-born children constitute 27:3% of our data set, while, conditional on being unborn, the
average time to birth at which the cases are presented to the facilitator is slightly below two months.
custody of the child selects the PAP.
33Any active application of that PAP for other children is dropped. In fact, the facilitator’s policy speciﬁes that
if the selected PAPs reject a match, they will not be allowed any further applications through the facilitator. Thus,
applications are binding from the PAPs’ point of view. The BMO stops receiving applications from other PAPs upon a
match. However, she can still decide to parent until she relinquishes parental rights.
34If no application is received after a wait of about one month, the facilitator usually reports the case as “closed.”
35Summary statistics correspond to different numbers of observations since, in some data points, not all attributes
were relevant or speciﬁed.
36The sample of children posted on the facilitator’s website is potentially biased with respect to the general population
of adopted children. However, because states are not legally required to report the number of domestic adoptions, there
are limited solid sources documenting characteristics of adopted kinships. The Census 2000 is the most recent source,
according to which the race breakdown of children adopted in the U.S., both domestically and internationally (where
the latter accounts for 13% of the total adopted children), is 58% Caucasian, 16% African-American, and 13% Hispanic
(the remaining portion corresponding to Asian and other races).
11Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Already Born 0.273 0.445 0 1 801
Months to Birth for Unborn 1.925 1.62 0.033 7.8 579
Months from Birth for Born 1.176 5.63 0.033 69.5 370
Days from First to Last Application 33.84 31.19 1 511 745
Days from Presentation on Site to Last Day on Site 51.04 42.18 1 511 804
Days on Site if Always Born 33.84 25.50 1 131 125
Days on Site if Always Unborn 53.67 38.25 1 217 477
Days on Site if Switch from Unborn to Born 85.55 53.17 3 240 138
Number of Interested PAPs 2.218 2.216 0 15 804
Applications Per Day 0.119 0.249 0 4 745
Bad Health Words 0.002 0.050 0 1 803
Single PAP Allowed 0.66 0.474 0 1 803
Same-Sex PAP Allowed 0.313 0.464 0 1 803
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.856 0.351 0 1 803
Girl 0.223 0.416 0 1 803
Boy 0.306 0.461 0 1 803
Caucasian 0.361 0.393 0 1 804
Hispanic 0.128 0.27 0 1 804
Asian 0.022 0.112 0 1 804
Non-African-American Boy 0.175 0.35 0 1 803
Non-African-American Girl 0.12 0.302 0 1 803
African-American 0.389 0.415 0 1 804
African-American Girl 0.102 0.279 0 1 803
African-American Boy 0.13 0.301 0 1 803
Domestic Finalization Cost 26290 8176 3500 52300 778
Table 1: Summary Statistics for BMOs
The average age of already-born children is just above one month. Conditional on being matched,
already-born children constitute only 11:1% of all matched children.
The estimated costs to ﬁnalize an adoption range from $3;500 to $52;300; in addition to the
$4;800 ﬁxed fee for working with the facilitator.
Finally, in terms of PAPs who are acceptable to BMOs, same-sex PAPs are allowed in 31:3% of
the cases, foreign PAPs in 85:6% of the cases, and single women in 66% of the cases.37
In terms of the outcomes of the matching process, the average number of PAPs who apply for a
given child is 2:2, varying from 0 to 15. BMOs decide to parent their child in 5:3% of the cases, are
reported as a lost contact in 5% of the cases, and as a closed case in 25:2% of cases. A match occurs
in 70% of the cases (13:5% through the facilitator). The average number of days a case remains on
the facilitator’s website is 45 days, ranging from 1 to 469 days. We note that the distributions of time
to birth when the child arrives on the facilitator’s website and when the child is matched look rather
different, as illustrated in Figure 2 in the Appendix.
37There are very few cases in which lesbian PAPs are allowed to apply and gay men are not, or vice-versa. The
variable ‘Same-sex Allowed’ identiﬁes a baby for which at least one of these PAP categories is considered acceptable.
123.2.2 Prospective Adoptive Parents’ Statistics
We now turn to the demand side, represented by the PAPs. The summary statistics on the PAPs’
attributes are in Table 2 below, while the summary statistics conditional on a match and the time
trends of some of the PAPs’ attributes are in Table 7.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Applies for a Baby (on a Speciﬁc Day) 0.053 0.047 0 0.501 675
Applies for a Baby (Allowed Choices only) 0.064 0.094 0 1 670
Applies for a Baby (at Some Point in Time) 0.060 0.058 0 0.504 675
Days between First and Last Application 103 171 1 1559 675
Days Since Last Application for a PAP 1.643 4.852 0 94.149 673
Gay PAP (Score) 0.064 0.218 0 1 613
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.065 0.222 0 1 612
Foreign PAP (Score) 0.516 0.165 0.001 0.999 674
Single PAP (Score) 0.083 0.271 0 1 613
Gay PAP (Unambiguous) 0.046 0.209 0 1 675
Lesbian PAP (Unambiguous) 0.047 0.213 0 1 675
Straight PAP (Unambiguous) 0.633 0.482 0 1 675
Ambiguous PAP Name 0.201 0.401 0 1 675
Table 2: Summary Statistics for PAPs
Recall that when a PAP applies for a speciﬁc baby, only the PAP’s ﬁrst name(s) appear on the
website next to the baby requested. We therefore infer PAPs’ characteristics based on their names
and on their behavior on the website. As a ﬁrst step, when the PAP consists of one person, we
identify that PAP as a single woman.38 Second, when the PAPs’ names unequivocally indicate that
the PAP is a straight couple, or a same-sex couple, we assign the relevant attribute to the PAP. Of the
PAPs that have names with unambiguous gender classiﬁcation, 63:3% are straight couples, 4:6% are
gay men, 4:7% are lesbians, and 8:3% are single women.39 We use these priors to construct straight,
gay, and lesbian scores for PAPs with names entailing some gender ambiguity.40
As for foreign PAPs, we infer their identities from their behavior on the website. Speciﬁcally,
assuming a symmetric prior, we compute the probability of a PAP being foreign using Bayesian
updating over a multinomial process.41
According to this classiﬁcation criterion, 78:8% of the PAPs in our sample are straight couples,
6:4% are gay couples, 6:5% are lesbian couples, and 8:3% are single women. In addition, 51:6% of
38According to an interview with the owner of the website, there are no single men among the PAPs.
39We use this ‘unambiguous’ score for some tables in the Appendix.
40For instance, ‘jack&jamie’ could be either a straight or a gay men couple and are coded with the corresponding
posterior of 0:92 = 0:633
0:633+0:046 that they are a straight couple as their “Straight PAP” score and with the complementary
posterior of 0:08 as their “Gay PAP” score. Similarly, ‘kim&jamie’ is coded with a 0:85 “Straight PAP” score, a 0:07
“Gay PAP” score, and a 0:08 “Lesbian PAP” score.
41Given a 50-50 division between foreign and domestic PAPs, we assume a 10% error-probability for foreign PAPs
applying for children for whom they are not allowed to apply. We compute the posterior probability of the PAP being
foreign (see the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of the ‘Foreign PAP’ score).
13the PAPs are foreign.
We consider a PAP active from the time at which the PAP submits the ﬁrst application until the
PAP is reported as “matched” or, if never reported as such, until ten days after the last application is
submitted.42 Given these assumptions, active PAPs apply for a child for which they are acceptable
with a 6:4% probability.
The average time elapsed between the PAPs’ ﬁrst and last application is 103 days. The (average)
application probability of a PAP for an available baby on each day is 5:3%; while the probability of
applying for that baby at some point is 6%.43
Finally, thecompositionofPAPshasbeenﬂuctuatingsomewhatovertheyears. Mostnotably, the
fraction of foreign PAPs, which varied between 57:5% and 60:3% between 2004 and 2007; dropped
to 50:3% in 2008 and to 37:4% in 2009; possibly reﬂecting the impact of the Hague Convention.
3.3 Adoption Finalization Cost Regressions
The estimated adoption ﬁnalization costs include several components. First, they contain the BMO’s
reimbursable expenses until birth, which can include rent, food, and medical costs. As discussed
above, these expenses are restricted by state law. Second, the adoption ﬁnalization costs contain
agency and legal fees. Typically these fee are less regulated than the BMO’s expenses.44
AsseeninSectionTable2, thereisalargevariance, withadoptionﬁnalizationcostsrangingfrom
$3;500 to $52;300; with a mean of $26;290: Figure 1 illustrates the density of adoption ﬁnalization
costs.
Table 3 contains results from a linear regression describing the correlation between adoption
ﬁnalization costs and different child characteristics, including year dummies for our full sample
and for the restricted samples of born and unborn children.45 Here and throughout the rest of the
regression tables, the t-statistics appear in parenthesis.
First, costs are rising over time, increasing by $10;000 from 2004 to 2009. The largest increase
occurred in 2008, coinciding with the ratiﬁcation of The Hague Convention.
Second, we ﬁnd that the adoption ﬁnalization costs respond in a signiﬁcant way to the race of
the child. Indeed, an African-American child is associated with costs that are $8;000 lower than the
ones associated with a non-African-American child.
Third, the adoption ﬁnalization costs are correlated with the child’s gender. The costs associated
with non-African-American boys are $2;000 lower than those associated with both non-African-
Americans girls and non-African-Americans of unknown gender. The link between gender and costs
42We provide robustness checks for our results with respect to the length of this window.
43For instance, consider a PAP who is active for 20 days and a BMO who is available over that entire period. Suppose
the PAP applies for the baby on day 11 (so that the PAP has an open application to the BMO from day 11 to day 20)
Then, the (average) application probability on each day is 50% while the probability of applying at some point in time
is 100%.
44Some states regulate agencies’ and facilitators’ fees. Usually, the only restriction is that they do not exceed the
customary levels in that state (see Jasper, 2008).
45The variables Single PAPs Allowed, Same-Sex PAPs Allowed, and Foreign PAPs Allowed are dummy variables that
attain the value of 1 when the corresponding PAP cateogory is allowed to apply by the BMO.
14Dependent Variable Full Sample Unborn Born
Finalization Cost in $1;000s I II III IV V VI
Already Born -1.14 -0.65
(-1.41) (-0.83)
Month to Birth -0.50** -0.28 -0.56** -0.41* -0.11 0.23
(-3.14) (-1.78) (-3.05) (-2.32) (-0.31) (0.59)
African-American Girl -8.77*** -7.99*** -9.55*** -8.52*** -5.32 -5.52
(-7.38) (-6.83) (-7.41) (-6.69) (-1.69) (-1.77)
African-American Boy -7.63*** -7.41*** -8.32*** -8.27*** -6.05* -5.21
(-6.69) (-6.66) (-6.50) (-6.64) (-2.29) (-1.98)
African-American Unknown Gender -7.74*** -7.71*** -8.59*** -8.35*** -3.91 -4.60
(-7.38) (-7.55) (-7.62) (-7.60) (-1.36) (-1.61)
Non-African-American Girl -0.03 -0.11 -0.37 -0.22 1.72 0.81
(-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.34) (-0.21) (0.60) (0.28)
Non-African-American Boy -1.93* -1.90* -2.13* -1.95* -0.63 -1.31
(-2.19) (-2.22) (-2.26) (-2.13) (-0.24) (-0.51)
Hispanic 0.29 0.19 -0.36 -0.54 2.88 2.91
(0.28) (0.19) (-0.30) (-0.47) (1.13) (1.16)
Asian 2.23 1.12 1.80 0.83 7.32 5.07
(0.92) (0.47) (0.73) (0.35) (0.54) (0.38)
Year 2004 -10.63*** -10.51*** -10.90*** -10.67*** -5.40 -4.66
(-10.76) (-10.73) (-10.68) (-10.58) (-0.83) (-0.72)
Year 2005 -9.01*** -9.55*** -9.27*** -9.77*** -2.95 -2.70
(-10.30) (-10.94) (-10.46) (-11.03) (-0.43) (-0.40)
Year 2006 -6.05*** -6.54*** -6.19*** -6.74*** -1.71 -0.58
(-6.08) (-6.66) (-5.96) (-6.56) (-0.26) (-0.09)
Year 2007 -5.58*** -4.44*** -4.90*** -4.17*** -1.86 0.02
(-5.42) (-4.26) (-4.15) (-3.60) (-0.28) (0.00)
Year 2008 -0.57 -1.37 -0.17 -0.96 -0.83 -1.02
(-0.54) (-1.32) (-0.16) (-0.92) (-0.12) (-0.14)
Single PAP Allowed 0.50 0.44 -0.02
(0.82) (0.67) (-0.01)
Same-Sex PAP Allowed -4.44*** -4.51*** -4.40*
(-6.40) (-6.03) (-2.11)
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.44 0.10 3.23
(0.58) (0.12) (1.40)
Constant 35.86*** 36.58*** 36.42*** 37.15*** 29.25*** 30.56***
(37.69) (37.19) (36.86) (36.41) (4.35) (4.51)
R2 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.17 0.22
Adjusted-R2 0.36 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.08 0.10
F-Stat 26.4 25.8 28.2 27.1 1.8 1.9
Babies 623 623 500 500 123 123
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American unborn child in 2009.
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Figure 1: Density of Finalization Cost
is suggestive of the limited regulation the adoption industry is subject to. Indeed, costs associated
with different races could, in principle, be explained by considering BMOs’ expenses (e.g., due to
segregation, BMOs’ of varying races may live in areas that correspond to different costs of living).
However, the gap between costs associated with the two genders is harder to explain through BMOs’
expenses alone.
We also ﬁnd that adoption ﬁnalization costs tend to increase over the pregnancy. This is surpris-
ing in that the BMOs’ expenses are, by nature, decreasing if the match occurs closer to birth. This
suggests that either costs are set in response to the child’s desirability, and such desirability mono-
tonically increases over the pregnancy, or that particular agencies with differing ﬁxed fees target
mothers at different stages of pregnancy.
Last, the BMO’s decision to allow applications from same-sex PAPs is associated with a signiﬁ-
cantly lower estimated cost (by over $4;400). These trends do not depend on whether or not children
are born (though signiﬁcance does decrease for the smaller sample of born children).
It is important to note that the adoption agencies set adoption ﬁnalization costs. Consequently,
they may be the channel through which the dependence of adoption ﬁnalization costs on child at-
tributes is formed. Namely, certain agencies may generally tend to set high costs (due to their
operating size, their reputation, etc.) and attract BMOs with children of particular attributes. We
return to this point in Section 5.4.
We stress that one needs to exercise caution in interpreting Table 3 as hedonic regressions of
prices that are set to clear the market. Indeed, we believe there are heavy institutional barriers
that make this difﬁcult. Having said that, learning over the years may have potentially allowed the
16population of agencies to adjust their fees and baby selection in the direction of a market-clearing
price.
Inthenextsections, weutilizeamodelofmatchingwithsearchfrictionstodirectlyelicitparents’
preferences from our data.
4 A Model of Matching with Search
In our environment, PAPs search for a BMO to be matched with, while BMOs search for a PAP
to relinquish their baby to. Therefore, we estimate a sequential two-sided matching model. In this
section, we present the basic structure of the model (which is closely related to Burdett and Coles,
1997 and Eeckhout, 1999) and characterize its equilibrium structure.
4.1 Underlying Framework
In our data set, we observe several types of PAPs: straight couples, gay men, lesbian couples, single
women, and foreign couples. These PAPs’ types may have dissimilar preferences over children’s
attributes and may impact the BMOs’ utilities differently. Formally, each type is characterized by
a vector of attributes and denoted by  = (1;:::;h) 2 PAP: BMOs may care about other PAP
attributes that need not affect PAPs’ preferences (e.g., wealth and looks). We capture such additional
attributes by a = (a1;:::;am) 2 APAP: We assume that (;a) is determined independently and
identically across PAPs, with a joint cumulative distribution FPAP.
We assume that each BMO is characterized by the child’s attributes c = (c1;:::;cn) 2 CBMO
(capturing the child’s race, gender, time to birth, and so on). Attributes are independently and
identically distributed across BMOs with a cumulative distribution FBMO: Each BMO is also char-
acterized by the set of types she is willing to consider   PAP (such as straight couples, U.S.
residents, etc). These are determined independently of the child’s attributes and of the set of types
other BMOs are willing to consider according to the cumulative distribution HBMO:46
4.1.1 Prospective Adoptive Parents
A PAP of type  2 PAP gains a match utility uPAP(;c) from adopting a child with attributes c.
We normalize the utility from remaining unmatched to zero, while we assume that the utility from
adopting any child is non-negative: uPAP(;c)  0 for all c and strictly positive for some c. This
amounts to assuming that the outside option (not pursuing adoption or pursuing it through a different
channel) is worse than the adoption of any child on the website.
46Acceptable categories of PAPs are arguably due to upbringing and ideological convictions that go beyond strategic
forces in the matching process we study. We therefore assume that acceptable categories of PAPs are exogenous and
independent of the child’s characteristics. Empirically, the most signiﬁcant restriction imposed by BMOs in our data
is whether they allow applications from same-sex couples and from foreign PAPs. However, none of the observable
characteristics of children explains these restrictions (see Table 12 in the Appendix). Having said that, the model would
extend directly to a situation in which the BMOs’ attributes do affect these limitations.
17PAPs have an arrival rate of . Each PAP experiences a discount factor of PAP. This discount
rate can be thought of as capturing PAPs’ fatigue or aging.
4.1.2 Birth Mothers
Each BMO gains a match utility uBMO(;a) from giving up her child to a PAP with attributes
(;a).47 WenormalizetheBMO’sutilityfrombeingunmatchedtozeroandassumethatuBMO(;a) >
0 for some PAP attributes (;a).48
A note on the modeling asymmetry we impose between the BMOs and PAPs is now in order.
In principle, some of the BMOs’ attributes could play a role in both the BMOs’ and the PAPs’
preferences. Empirically, however, this does not seem to be the case – BMOs’ observable decisions
do not seem to differ across child attributes (we return to this point in Section 6 below).
BMOs have an arrival rate of  and experience a discount factor of BMO. This discount fac-
tor can be interpreted as the forgone monetary ﬂow that birth mothers give up by not committing
immediately to a match.49
4.1.3 The Dynamic Matching Process
Upon arrival in the matching process, a PAP of type  may or may not submit an application to each
BMO that enters the process and allows applications from PAPs of type .
As described above, an application involves a letter from the PAP to the BMO. This letter is
effectively comprised of two elements: the type  of the PAP submitting the application and a noisy
signal  of the PAP’s remaining attributes a (the letter could suggest certain characteristics to BMOs,
such as afﬂuence, warmth, etc., but may not accurately describe the vector a of attributes the BMO
may be interested in). That is, the BMO observes an application of the form (;), where we assume
that the signal  has full support (of APAP) and denote by GPAP(ja) its conditional distribution.
We denote by UBMO(;) = EGPAP fuBMO(;a)jg the BMO’s expected utility associated with
the application (;). We assume that the parameters of the model are common knowledge among
all participants.50
A BMO who receives an application immediately decides whether to accept it or reject it.51
47As described above, in certain cases, an adoption agency has physical custody of the child. We assume that adoption
agencies perceive the best interest of the child in alignment with the BMO’s preferences, and so this does not affect our
analysis.
48In general, uBMO(;a) may be negative. This allows some mothers to decide during the matching process to
mother the child or use alternative routes for adoption.
49We assume that BMOs’ discount factor does not depend on the child’s attribute, not even on the time to birth,
despite it being correlated with the time on the site (see discussion in Section 6). Table 1 implies a case resolution that
is very quick (around one month). This short time interval suggests that decisions of BMOs do not change dramatically
over their duration on the site, making the uniformity of the discount factor an arguably weak assumption.
50In particular, this implies that no learning about the market per se is taking place. This is consistent with our
empirical observations – we do not identify differences in PAPs’ and BMOs’ behavior across time.
51The assumption that agents consider potential matches one at a time is standard in the literature on bilateral search
(see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright, 2005). Technically, it dramatically simpliﬁes the equilibrium characterization of our
model. In particular, it implies that a PAP’s decision whether to send an application out does not depend on the number
18When an application is accepted, the match gets irreversibly formed and the corresponding PAP and
BMO exit the process. Otherwise, both the PAP and the BMO stay in the matching process.
4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium behavior of PAPs and BMOs. Notice, ﬁrst, that
we can restrict attention to stationary reservation utility strategies for both PAPs and BMOs.52
In equilibrium, each PAP of type  and attributes a has a reservation utility  uPAP(;a): That is,
upon considering a BMO i with a set i of acceptable PAPs’ types and with child’s attributes c, a
PAP of type  2 i submits an application if and only if uPAP (;c)   uPAP(;a).
Similarly, each BMO i with acceptable types i and a child of attributes c has a reservation
utility  uBMO(i;c). Upon considering an application (;) from a PAP of type  2 i, the BMO
will accept the application if and only if UBMO (;)   uBMO(i;c).
Given thresholds f uPAP(;a)g2;a2APAP and f uBMO(;c)gPAP;c2C ; the arrival rates ;;
together with the distributions FPAP;GPAP;FBMO; and HBMO; each PAP of type  and attributes a
faces an equilibrium arrival rate r;a of BMOs’ acceptances, and an equilibrium distribution of these
BMOs’ attributes ;a. Similarly, a BMO of type  with a child of attributes c faces an arrival rate
of applications s;c and an equilibrium distribution of these PAPs’ attributes  ;c.53
Denote by VPAP(;c) the continuation value of a type  PAP considering a BMO whose child
has attributes c. The following Bellman equation corresponds to the PAP’s optimization problem:






The solution to this problem is the reservation utility  uPAP(;a) such that:






Er;a;;a [uPAP (;c) j uPAP (;c)   uPAP(;a)] (1)
and identity of the other PAPs interested in the same child. The justiﬁcation for this assumption is in the monetary ﬂow
the BMO forgoes by not making an immediate decision paired with the relatively short interval of time that a BMO
spends in the matching process.
52As highlighted in Burdett and Coles (1997), this model can lead to multiple equilibria. We could impose regularity
conditions on uPAP and uBMO that would guarantee uniqueness (mirroring, for example, the structure imposed by
Eeckhout, 1999). However, since all equilibria are characterized by reservation strategies, such additional assumptions
are not necessary for the purpose of our estimations.
53We are essentially characterizing a partial equilibrium of this environment in that the distributions over characteris-
tics are assumed exogenous. As discussed in Burdett and Coles (1999), this can be viewed as a full equilibrium if one
assumes the appearance of ‘clones’ of agents who leave the market. Alternatively, under simple regularity assumptions,
one can show that, in fact, there exist distributions constituting part of a full equilibrium. However, we stress that the
key insight for our estimations is the equilibrium use of threshold strategies.




Es;c; ;c [UBMO (;) j UBMO (;)   uBMO(;c)] (2)
Equations (1) and (2) fully characterize an equilibrium of this model.54
We conclude with two remarks. First, although we assumed that PAPs get positive utility from
adopting any child on the website, in equilibrium, their reservation utility may be above the utility
of adopting some of these children. Thus, in equilibrium, some BMOs may not ﬁnd a suitable PAP.
Second, note that our data describe the operation of one adoption facilitator, while the PAPs and
BMOs whom we observe participating may take part in parallel matching processes through other
channels (e.g., religious organizations, private attorneys, etc.). Thus, it is inherently difﬁcult for us
to identify the arrival and departure rates of PAPs and BMOs together with utilities corresponding
to all types of participants. We use the information on whether PAPs and BMOs fall above or below
each other’s reservation utility mainly to make inferences on the relative importance of different
babies’ and PAPs’ characteristics.
5 Estimating Adoptive Parents’ Preferences
This section presents our estimations regarding PAPs’ preferences. We are interested in studying
PAPs’ preferences over gender, race, time to birth, and costs. Since many adoption-policy debates
revolve around the participation of special categories of PAPs (such as same-sex couples, singles,
and foreign PAPs), we analyze how the preferences with respect to children’s attributes vary across
these categories. This will allow us to examine how a participation ban on speciﬁc categories of
PAPs would affect outcomes.
An observation in our sample corresponds to a triplet (t;b;p); where t identiﬁes a date, b a baby
who is unmatched on the website at date t, and p a PAP that is active on the website at time t and for
whom b is an available choice – that is, b’s BMO did not exclude the type of PAP p upon entering
the matching process. Recall that we consider a PAP active from the time at which the PAP submits
the ﬁrst application until the PAP is reported as “matched” or, if it is never reported as such, until
ten days after the last application is submitted.55
The model of Section 4 implies that a baby receives an application from a PAP if and only if
the PAP’s utility from being matched with that baby exceeds the PAP’s reservation utility. For the
sake of estimation, we consider a stochastic version of the model above and assume that each PAP
54Note that the particular structure of the noise in our model assures that PAPs who submit an application are never
indifferent between applying and not applying.
55In principle, the window of activity is important for our estimations as we assume that active PAPs who do not
apply for available babies value them below their threshold. In the Appendix, we discuss the robustness of our results to
a window of 90 days (Table 8). Also, Table 9 illustrates results obtained looking at the decision of a PAP to apply to a
BMO without including the time variation t. These alternative deﬁnitions of PAP activity do not have a large impact on
our results.
20of type  assesses the utility from a child of characteristics c as
uPAP (;c) =   c + ;0 + "tbp  uPAP(); (3)
where ;0 is a constant term that varies with PAP’s type and year, and "tbp is an idiosyncratic
unobservable distributed according to the standard normal distribution (corresponding to each triplet
(t;b;p)).56
The speciﬁcation allows us to estimate discrete choice models in which the probability of ap-
plying for a match with a speciﬁc child depends on the child’s observable attributes. Note that this
method enables us to evaluate the weights that different types of PAPs put on different attributes.
However, it does not allow us to identify the absolute level of the reservation utility corresponding
to (1), as it is confounded with the constant term in the utility speciﬁcation.
The model is useful in two respects. First, it provides a justiﬁcation for these estimations. In
particular, it validates the separate estimation of PAPs’ and BMOs’ preferences (rather than the
estimation of a simultaneous set of equations capturing the demand and supply of children, which
would have emerged from a static model). Second, it links the estimated constant term with an
endogenousreservationutility(inadditiontoaconstantassociatedwiththeparents’utilityfunction),
affecting its interpretation.
Table 4 below presents the results of probit estimations targeted at assessing PAPs’ preferences
over different attributes and their dependence on PAPs’ categories. We cluster standard errors by
child-PAP pair to account for serial correlation, since a PAP’s application is kept on the website until
the baby is matched.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 refers to the behavior of the entire PAP population. It corresponds
to a model in which the different categories of PAPs in our sample—straight couples, gay men,
single women, lesbian couples, and foreign PAPs—are characterized by the same utility function—
namely, the coefﬁcients  in (3) are restricted to be identical across PAPs—but may have different
thresholds (captured by the dummy variables corresponding to PAPs’ categories) due to the different
streams of children for whom they can be considered. The PAPs-category dummy variables in the
ﬁrst column are signiﬁcantly different from one another, highlighting the response of PAPs to the
matching dynamics. The remaining columns of Table 4 correspond to estimated models in which
different categories of PAPs are allowed to have different preferences. In what follows, we ﬁrst
discuss the aggregate preferences over children’s attributes and then compare estimated preferences
across different categories of PAPs.
The omitted category corresponding to all estimations reported in Table 4 is a 2009 baby, a
month before birth, whose gender is still unknown, whose race composition is zero percent African-
American, and whose adoption ﬁnalization costs are $26;000. This omitted category of babies has
a 7:3% probability of receiving an application, while a child whose attributes correspond to the
population means (as reported in Table 1) receives an application with a probability of 8:6%.
AccordingtothethirdandfourthcolumnsofTable4, gayandlesbiancoupleshaveasigniﬁcantly
56Formally, PAPs’ threshold  uPAP(;a) depends on the PAPs’ unobserved attributes a: Since we assume that these
attributes do not enter directly into the PAPs’ utility assessments, our estimations are not affected by the inherent aggre-
gation over these unobserved characteristics.
21Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP Foreign PAP
PAP Applies for Baby (Score) (Scorey) (Scorey) (Scorey)
 Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.016* -0.021** -0.074 -0.064 0.026 -0.025**
(-2.35) (-3.15) (-1.48) (-0.84) (0.84) (-2.66)
Months to Birth -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(-3.26) (-3.29) (-0.77) (-0.54) (-1.13) (-2.50)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.013 -0.091* -0.020* -0.024***
(-5.69) (-4.93) (-0.58) (-2.57) (-2.16) (-5.89)
African-American Girl -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.181** -0.189** -0.052* -0.039***
(-6.22) (-4.98) (-2.80) (-2.66) (-2.18) (-3.51)
African-American Boy -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.047 -0.093 -0.077** -0.062***
(-7.70) (-6.89) (-0.76) (-1.07) (-2.74) (-5.19)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.069*** -0.067*** -0.091 -0.089 -0.073*** -0.061***
(-8.15) (-7.19) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-3.59) (-5.50)
Non-African-American Girl 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.121 0.229* 0.032 0.025*
(4.26) (3.49) (1.50) (2.57) (1.38) (2.49)
Non-African-American Boy -0.007 -0.010 0.014 0.115 0.001 0.003
(-1.06) (-1.43) (0.25) (1.90) (0.07) (0.34)
Hispanic 0.002 0.004 0.117 -0.023 -0.024 0.005
(0.27) (0.49) (1.47) (-0.21) (-0.95) (0.48)
Year 2004 (d) -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.035 -0.088 0.014 -0.052***
(-7.79) (-6.15) (-0.59) (-1.52) (0.56) (-6.37)
Year 2005 (d) -0.036*** -0.020** -0.056 -0.076 -0.003 -0.043***
(-5.68) (-2.90) (-1.07) (-1.40) (-0.14) (-4.36)
Year 2006 (d) -0.009 0.009 0.119 -0.060 0.012 -0.006
(-1.24) (1.03) (1.30) (-0.93) (0.36) (-0.57)
Year 2007 (d) -0.024*** -0.005 0.025 -0.190*** 0.034 -0.022*
(-3.65) (-0.59) (0.44) (-6.11) (0.74) (-2.27)
Year 2008 (d) 0.014* 0.029** 0.012 0.067 0.042 0.026*
(2.00) (3.19) (0.31) (1.55) (1.82) (2.32)
Gay PAP (Score) 0.061***
(4.78)
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.093***
(7.71)
Single PAP (Score) 0.003
(0.45)
Foreign PAP (Score) 0.077***
(7.21)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.086 0.072 0.165 0.193 0.079 0.091
Probability for Base Case ~ 0.073 0.115 0.172 0.263 0.094 0.151
2 407.23 203.14 37.39 55.51 42.27 148.01
Log-Likelihood -205182.0 -170467.6 -27102.0 -29930.5 -25409.0 -208980.9
Observations 818413 708443 66190 60804 96665 734659
PAP-Babies 29053 25459 2382 2134 3134 27128
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ~
Note that the omitted category is an unknown-gender, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth, with ﬁnalization
costs of $26,000 in 2009. y: Gay, lesbian, and foreign estimated using weighted probit.
Table 4: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Activity Window of 10 Days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
22higher probability of submitting an application than straight couples. Indeed, the probability of
submitting an application for the child whose attributes correspond to the population mean is 7:2%
for straight couples, 16:5% for gay PAPs, 19:3% for lesbian PAPs, 7:9% for single women, and 9:1%
for foreign PAPs. These can be partly explained by the constraints that gay and lesbian couples face
when adopting a baby: Since many of the children on this website are not available to them, gay and
lesbian couples conceivably compensate by applying more frequently when they can.57
5.1 Preferences over Gender
In our data, the gender of each baby is “boy,” “girl,” or “unknown.” A baby of unknown gender is
either a baby at an earlier stage of gestation or a baby who is less likely to have received medical
attention than a baby whose gender is known. In order not to confound gender and health effects, we
measure the PAPs’ gender bias by comparing the probabilities of receiving an application between
girls and boys.
Non-African-American girls have a probability of receiving an application that is 3:6% higher
than non-African-American boys, a large effect given that the child with mean attributes has a prob-
ability of 8:6% of receiving an application. In other words, PAPs have a positive and sizable bias in
favor of (non-African-American) girls. We can quantify the gender bias in dollar terms by compar-
ing the effect of gender to the effect of adoption ﬁnalization costs. The increase in desirability of a
non-African-American girl with respect to a non-African-American boy is equivalent to a decrease
of $16;000 in ﬁnalization costs.58 This higher desirability of girls is consistent with anecdotal evi-
dence reported by adoption agencies and the popular press covering the adoption process.59 It is also
consistent with adoption outcomes in the U.S. Indeed, the Census 2000 reported 47% male adopted
children as compared with 51% male biological children (see Kreider, 2003). A preference for girls
has also been documented for biological mothers by Gallup polls, though, interestingly, biological
fathers tend to report a preference for boys.
In our data, the preference for girls is apparent, though somewhat different, across all categories
of PAPs. Lesbian couples exhibit, by far, the most intense preference for non-African-American
girls. Indeed, for non-African-American children, the estimated difference in application probabil-
ities between girls and boys is 3:5% for straight couples, 10:7% for gay couples, 11:4% for lesbian
couples, 3:1% for single women, and 2:2% for foreign PAPs. The large gender biases pertaining to
gay and straight PAPs suggest that women’s preference for girls is not the sole driving force behind
this bias.60 We note that there is a strand of literature based on hypothetical surveys of different
57As mentioned before, these baseline probabilities confound the differing reservation utilities and the constant terms
in the utility functions corresponding to different categories of PAPs and, therefore, should be interpreted with caution.
In particular, the differences between these probabilities do not fully mirror the differences between the coefﬁcients of
the dummy variables corresponding to PAP categories in the ﬁrst column of the table.
58Note that if the ﬁnalization costs are positively correlated with some unobservable but desirable child attributes,
$16;000 becomes an upper bound of the willingness to pay for a non-African-American girl with respect to a non-
African-American boy.
59See, for instance, Slate (1/16/2004).
60We mention that the gender biases we observe in gay men and single women, despite being large in sizes, are not
signiﬁcant due to the scarcity of observations.
23classes of PAPs regarding preferences over children’s gender (see Goldberg, 2009, and references
therein). Our results are the ﬁrst to report a stronger preference over children’s gender for same-sex
than for straight PAPs.
Table 4 also highlights a positive and sizable (although not statistically signiﬁcant) bias for
African-American girls with respect to African-American boys. In particular, the difference be-
tween the application probabilities for an African-American boy and an African-American girl is
1:8%. This difference results in an overall application probability of 3:4% for African-American
girls and 1:6% for African-American boys. In other words, the probability of an African-American
girl receiving an application is more than double that of an African-American boy. In relative terms,
the gender bias for African-American babies is larger than the bias for non-African-American ba-
bies.
This observation is compatible with the idea that girls are viewed as “safer” in terms of dys-
functional behavior and are, therefore, more appealing candidates for adoption.61 Furthermore, this
conjecture would suggest that the gender gap should be stronger for African-American children, for
whom the gap in terms of negative outcomes is greater between the genders.62
We note that the substantial preference for girls we document constitutes a reversal, in the adop-
tion environment, of the preference for sons identiﬁed by the literature studying the preferences
over gender of biological children by looking at indirect indicators such as divorce, likelihood of
the mother’s remarriage, etc. For instance, Dahl and Moretti (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrst-born daughters
are associated with a range of negative predicaments for the survival of couples.63 Since the Census
2000 suggests that approximately 50% of households containing adopted children do not include
any biological child, it is difﬁcult to explain this inconsistency by the mere ordering of children in
the family.64
5.2 Preferences over Race
To our knowledge, racial preferences over offspring have not yet been documented. Anecdotal evi-
dence from adoption agencies and facilitators suggest that there are greater difﬁculties in matching
African-American children with respect to other ethnicities. However, to this date, the only evidence
61There are some data backing such perceptions. For instance, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that lifetime
chances of a person going to prison are signiﬁcantly higher for men (11.3%) than for women (1.8%). Also, girls are less
likely to develop behavioral problems such as autism spectrum disorders (four times more prevalent in boys than in girls,
according to the Autism Society of America), or ADHD (diagnosed two to four times as frequently in boys as in girls,
see Dulcan, 1997). This conjecture has been mentioned repeatedly in the popular press, see, e.g., Slate (10/14/2003 and
1/16/2004).
62In terms of incarceration, the U.S. Department of Justice reports that the imprisonment statistics in 2001 were:
16.6% for African-American males, 7.7% for Hispanic males, 2.6% for Caucasian males, 1.7% for African-American
females, 0.7% for Hispanic females, and 0.3% for Caucasian females.
63Speciﬁcally, Dahl and Moretti (2008) report that (i) women are less likely to remarry if they have a ﬁrst-born
daughter than if they have a ﬁrst-born son; (ii) couples tend to divorce less often if they have ﬁrst-born sons rather
ﬁrst-born daughters; and (iii) the number of children is signiﬁcantly higher in families with ﬁrst-born girls.
64Indeed, such an explanation would require parents to have dramatically different gender preferences between ﬁrst
and later children.
24tosupportthisclaimhadbeenthegapbetweentheproportionofAfrican-Americanchildrenawaiting
adoption in the U.S. foster-care system (32% in 2006, according to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services Report) and the proportion of African-American children in the total (domestic
and international) population of adoptees (16% in 2000, according to the Census). Although sug-
gestive, these statistics cannot be directly related to PAPs’ preferences. In that respect, our data set
provides a direct channel to estimate parents’ racial biases in the adoption environment.65
Our results show that a baby’s aggregate probability of receiving an application is considerably
affected by his or her race. In particular, this probability dramatically decreases if the baby is, at
least partially, African-American.
Projecting the marginal effect linearly, the probability that a 100% African-American baby
(of unknown gender) receives an application is 1:7% in contrast to a probability of 13% for a
0% African-American baby.66 Similarly, application probabilities decrease dramatically for both
African-American girls and boys. In other words, PAPs in our sample exhibit a large and negative
bias against African-American babies.
Again, the estimated effect of ﬁnalization costs in Table 4 allows us to convert the racial bias
into dollars. The increase in desirability of a non-African-American baby with respect to one with
mean attributes is equivalent to $38;000 decrease in ﬁnalization costs. In fact, using the linear
interpolation described above, as well as the incidence of the African-American attribute in our
sample, we obtain a willingness to pay for a 100% African-American baby with respect to a 0%
African-American baby as high as $62;000:67
Physical similarity may be underlying these preferences. In fact, preference for similarity, or
homophily, is a well-known and documented phenomenon in the sociology literature (see McPher-
son, M., L. Smith-Lovin, and J. Cook (2001) and references therein).68 In the context of adoption,
homophily may manifest itself in the desire of PAPs to adopt children who are similar to them and
could, therefore, appear as their biological offspring. Since the large majority of PAPs in our data
set are Caucasian, homophily would be consistent with a negative attitude toward African-American
children.69
Hispanic children account for 12:8% of babies on the website. However, we do not ﬁnd a racial
bias for or against Hispanics. The estimated desirability of Caucasian and Hispanic children is
65Estimating preferences over physical characteristics of biological children is inherently difﬁcult due to the limited
choice parents have over offsprings’ appearance. Furthermore, according to the Census 2000, only 4% of marriages in
the U.S. are interracial, so variation in the race of biological children may be challenging to assess.
66The 13% probability is derived through a linear interpolation of the 1:7% probability of application for a 100%
African-American baby (of unknown gender) and the 8:6% probability of application for the baby with mean attributes
(according to Table 1, such a baby is 38:9% African-American).
67On the other hand, as before, if the ﬁnalization costs are positively correlated with some unobservable but desirable
child attributes, our estimate for the willingness to pay for a non-African-American baby with respect to an African-
American one should be revised downward.
68This desire for similarity would be in line with racial preferences over romantic partners documented by Fisman,
Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006, 2008).
69Indeed, according to the Census 2000, only 12% of adoptive parents in the U.S. are African-American. In addition,
according to an informal assessment of the facilitator, the vast majority of the participating PAPs is Caucasian. African-
Americans and Hispanics constitute only an approximate 1% of the PAPs. African-American and Hispanic PAPs are
known to favor other adoption channels (local religious communities, extended families, etc.).
25roughly identical, with a non-signiﬁcant increase of the application probability of 0:2% if the baby
is Hispanic. To the extent that Hispanic children may look different than Caucasian children, this
suggests that a preference for physical similarity alone cannot account for the racial biases we ob-
serve.
In terms of different PAP categories, we ﬁnd that the bias against African-American children is
similar across straight, gay men, lesbian couples. The negative effect on the application probability
for an African-American child of a straight couple is  4:5% for a girl,  6:7% for a boy, and  6:7%
forachildofunknowngender, offanapplicationprobabilityof7:2%forachildwithmeanattributes.
This same effect on the application probability of gay men is  18:1% for a girl,  4:7% for a boy
and  9:1% for a child of unknown gender, off an application probability of 16:5% for a child with
mean attributes. Likewise, this effect for lesbian couples is  18:9% for a girl,  9:3% for a boy,
and  8:9% for a child of unknown gender, off an application probability of 19:3% for a child with
mean attributes. These observations suggest that the racial bias against African-American children
is somewhat stronger (although in some cases not signiﬁcantly so) for gay men and lesbian couples
than for straight couples.
Moreover, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant racial biases for single women, for whom we ﬁnd an effect on the
application probability for an African-American child of  5:2% for a girl,  7:7% for a boy, and
 7:3% for a baby of unknown gender, off application probability of 7:9% for a child with mean
attributes.
Finally, the foreign PAPs’ racial bias is somewhat lower than that identiﬁed for straight couples.
Indeed, the overall probabilities of submitting an application for African-American girls, African-
American boys, and African-American babies of unknown gender are consistently higher for foreign
PAPs (5:2%, 2:9%, and 3%, respectively) than for straight couples (2:7%; 0:5%; and 0:5%; respec-
tively).
5.3 Preferences over Time to Birth and Child Age
Understanding how the desirability of a baby changes during the pregnancy and after birth is relevant
for evaluating how a disruption of an adoption plan at different stages of the BMO’s pregnancy and
child growth can affect adoption outcomes.
Tables 4 and 10 show estimates regarding the desirability of unborn children over the pregnancy
and of already-born children. Table 4 reports a probability of 7% for an already-born child to receive
an application, while the same probability for an unborn child is 8:6%. Note that this signiﬁcant
decrease occurs despite the fact that the average age of already-born babies in our sample is just
over 1 month.
Table 4 suggests a signiﬁcant negative effect of time to birth for unborn babies. In Table 10,
we allow for nonlinearities over the months to birth. We ﬁnd that, while in the ﬁrst 6 months of
pregnancy application probabilities increase rapidly, going monotonically from 3:6% to 7%; they
are fairly constant over the three months preceding birth.70
70This is somewhat surprising in view of the documented importance of pre-natal care in early stages of pregnancy
(see, e.g., http://www.expectantmothersguide.com).
26In principle, there are two opposing effects at work that inﬂuence babies’ desirability over time.
On the one hand, a match occurring early in the pregnancy offers PAPs the possibility of monitoring
the BMO’s health habits and medical conditions for a longer portion of the pregnancy.71 On the
other hand, several forces make BMOs early in their pregnancy potentially less appealing. First,
since the law does not allow the BMO to relinquish parental rights until after the birth, a BMO who
is in early pregnancy might be more tentative about relinquishing her baby for adoption and has
more time to reconsider her decision. Thus, BMOs that are in late pregnancy can be perceived as
more committed to the adoption plan. Second, since PAPs typically cover the BMO’s living and
medical expenses from the time of the match until the delivery, an early match could entail more
risk with respect to the ultimate costs. Indeed, if the BMO eventually reconsiders the adoption plan,
all the costs incurred up to that point are non-recoverable for the PAPs. Our results show that the
effects that make a BMO that is closer to delivery more appealing to PAPs are dominant.
5.4 Preferences over Adoption Finalization Costs
Our analysis reveals that PAPs’ application behavior is signiﬁcantly affected by the cost of ﬁnal-
izing the adoption. However, the effects we ﬁnd are not very large in aggregate terms. Indeed,
Table 4 shows that an increase in adoption ﬁnalization costs of $10;000 decreases the probability of
receiving an application from 8:6% to 6:8%:
Recall that our hedonic regressions suggested a strong dependence of adoption ﬁnalization costs
on attributes. Those observations, together with the identiﬁed relative price inelasticity, suggest that
variance in costs may be driven largely by the adoption agencies that select particular BMOs to
work with. Namely, our observations indicate that some, possibly more established and reputable,
agencies may set higher fees and be more effective at ﬁnding a match for their BMOs. The results
in Table 4 also suggest that such agencies may be less likely to target African-American babies and
BMOs at an early stage of their pregnancies.
Finally, we ﬁnd that alternative PAP categories respond quite differently to changes in adoption
ﬁnalization costs. Indeed, lesbian couples seem to respond to changes in adoption ﬁnalization costs
more than straight and gay couples, single women and foreign PAPs. Thus a $10;000 increase in
adoption ﬁnalization costs reduces the desirability of a child by 1:6% for straight couples, 1:3% for
gay men, 9:1% for lesbian couples, 2% for single women, and 2:4% for foreigners. The sensitivity
of these categories is consistent with the Census 2000, which reports that adoptive straight couples
and gay men are, on average, wealthier than single women and lesbian couples.
6 Birth Mothers’ Choices and Matching Outcomes
Conditional on putting up their children for adoption through an agency and the facilitator, BMOs
make two distinct choices that we observe in our data: Ex-ante, they decide which categories of
71It is often the case that, after the match takes place, the matched PAPs monitor the BMO’s medical condition
and lifestyle. Depending on PAPs’ state of residence, this can be done, for example, by offering the BMO to move
temporarily to the PAPs’ geographical area or home until the delivery.
27PAPs are acceptable, and, ex-post, they resolve the case by selecting one of the PAP applications
received, deciding to parent, or losing contact with the facilitator.
As discussed in Section 4, the ex-ante choice of acceptable categories of PAPs cannot be ex-
plained by baby attributes, as can be seen in Table 12 in the Appendix. In fact, the only signiﬁcant
predictors of the choice of acceptable categories are the year in which the cases were presented and
the adoption ﬁnalization costs. Speciﬁcally, both gay men and lesbian PAPs were signiﬁcantly less
likely to be acceptable prior to 2007 (by 18%   30% between 2004 and 2006, relative to 2009).
According to the time trends reported in Table 7 in the Appendix, the fraction of gay, lesbian, and
foreign PAPs was fairly stable through time. In that respect, the increase in BMOs’ propensity to
allow same-sex PAPS may reﬂect a shift in BMOs’ preferences (mirroring important ideological and
political changes, e.g., legalization of gay marriages in several states). In addition, a BMO’s deci-
sion to allow applications from same-sex PAPs is signiﬁcantly correlated with adoption ﬁnalization
costs, with higher costs corresponding to a substantially lower probability of same-sex PAPs being
declared acceptable.72
The propensity to consider foreign PAPs was consistently and signiﬁcantly higher prior to 2008,
echoing the difﬁculties of adoption by foreign parents imposed by the ratiﬁcation of the Hague
Convention in early 2008.
Regarding the BMOs’ selection of PAPs among those who apply, we cannot reject BMOs’ se-
lecting one of the applications randomly. Indeed, a model in which the chosen PAP is allowed to
depend on all observable characteristics (namely, the volume of applicants and the categories to
which they belong, in addition to the relevant baby’s attributes) generates no signiﬁcant proxies of
choice (see Table 13 in the Appendix).
BMOs can also decide to match through channels other than the facilitator, or to forgo commit-
ting to an adoption agreement altogether (thereby deciding to parent or to relinquish their children
to foster care).73 In our sample, 13:4% of cases result in a match through the facilitator, and, overall,
70% of cases become matched through the facilitator or in other ways.74 Table 5 contains estimation
results regarding the determinants of a successful match, through the facilitator or through other
channels, controlling for all observable baby characteristics.
Several insights come out of these estimations. First, the successful match of a baby is weakly
associated with some constraints imposed by BMOs. Speciﬁcally, the establishment of a match is
negatively linked with allowing applications from same-sex PAPs. We interpret this result as consis-
tent with the presence of some adoption agencies being particularly effective in ﬁnding matches and,
at the same time, more restrictive in their attitudes toward same-sex PAPs. Also, Table 5 suggests
72We suspect that the correlation between banning same-sex couples and ﬁnalization costs is due to the fact that
adoption agencies that ban same-sex couples also make greater investments in legal and medical services, rather than
because of BMOs’ decisions per se.
73Foster care is notoriously harmful in terms of outcomes. It is associated with a far higher rate of post-care home-
lessness (40% are homeless within 18 months of discharge, according to the U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce, 1999).
Foster care is also associated with a much higher rate of incarceration. In California, 70% of all penitentiary inmates
have spent time in foster care (Select Committee Hearing of the California Legislature, 2006).
74Reported decisions to parent occurred in only 5% of cases, whereas cases were determined closed, without a speci-
ﬁed resolution, in 4:8% of the cases (which may entail some unreported matches and some decisions to parent).
28Dependant Variable Matched Matched through Facilitator
Already Born (d) 0.04 -0.10***
(0.29) (-4.08)




Girl (d) 0.19** -0.03
(2.88) (-0.69)
Boy (d) 0.18** 0.04
(2.72) (0.92)
PAP Arrival Rate Per Day 0.61** 0.16**
(3.22) (2.75)
Finalization Cost (in 10 000s of dollars) 0.12* 0.07*
(2.41) (2.55)
Same-Sex PAP Allowed (d) -0.24** 0.04
(-2.74) (0.70)
Single PAP Allowed (d) -0.00 0.00
(-0.05) (0.04)
Foreign PAP Allowed (d) 0.02 0.07*
(0.24) (2.00)
Year 2005 (d) 0.14 -0.01
(1.26) (-0.21)
Year 2006 (d) 0.10 -0.01
(0.87) (-0.23)
Year 2007 (d) 0.03 0.03
(0.27) (0.37)
Year 2008 (d) -0.01 0.10
(-0.07) (1.08)




(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Note that the
omitted category is an unknown-gender, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth,
with ﬁnalization costs of $26,000 in 2009.
Table 5: Matching Regression – Marginal Effect from Probit of a Child Finding a Match.
29that the matches through the facilitator are positively associated with allowing applications from
foreign PAPs.
Second, the application arrival rate signiﬁcantly affects the likelihood of a match. In order
to get a sense of the magnitudes, and bearing in mind the fact that the average time from ﬁrst
to last application for a baby on the website is 33 days, our estimations suggest that an increase
of three applications corresponds to the overall probability of a successful match increasing by
approximately 6%.
Third, the knowledge of a baby’s gender (be it a boy or a girl) is associated with a signiﬁcantly
higher probability of a match. This is particularly intuitive in view of the distribution of the time to
birth. Recall that the average time to birth of an unborn baby in our sample is about two months. At
that stage, not knowing the gender of the child is a strong signal of very limited medical attention
(an ultrasound exam would reveal a child’s gender starting from approximately the 20th week of
gestation). In that respect, the knowledge of the child’s gender serves as a proxy for medical care
(and our results are consistent with the preference for girls identiﬁed through PAPs’ choices in
Section 5).
Last, on average, higher adoption ﬁnalization costs are linked with higher probabilities of a
match. Ceteris paribus, an increase of $10;000 corresponds to an increase of 7% in the probability
of a match through the facilitator, and an increase of 12% in the probability of a reported match
through any channel. This result is consistent with adoption agencies playing an important role
in setting prices, and generating matches. Speciﬁcally, a link between costs and the probabilities
of a match may be the result of two effects: (i) more expensive agencies being more effective in
generating matches, and, as discussed in Section 3.3, (ii) more expensive agencies targeting babies
that are desirable in terms of unobserved characteristics, resulting in more successful matches.
7 Policy Implications
7.1 Gay and Lesbian Adoption
When considering the debate on whether to ban or allow gay and lesbian adoption, it is important to
note two facets of adoption outcomes.75 First, studies tracking adopted children identify some posi-
tive effects and no negative effects of adoption by gay or lesbian parents as opposed to heterosexual
parents.76 Second, there are monetary costs states incur when restricting adoption. Barth, Lee, Wild-
ﬁre, and Guo (2006), as well as Hansen and Hansen (2006), show that state and federal governments
save between $65;422 and $126;825 on the average child who enters care at age three if he or she
is adopted rather than remaining in state care throughout childhood. Furthermore, Hansen (2006)
calculated that the human service costs of adoption are about one-half the costs of long-term foster
75For an overview of state jurisdictions regarding same-sex adoption, as well as their implications on outcomes, see
Howard and Freundlich (2008).
76See Brewaeys, Ponjaert, Van Hall, and Golombok (1997); Golombok, Perry, Burston, Murray, Mooney-Sommer,
Stevens, and Golding (2003); Golombok, Spencer, and Rutter (1983); and Wainwright, Russell, and Patterson, (2004).
30care.77
In order to estimate the impact of the participation of same-sex couples in the adoption process,
we assess the number of matches of children and adoptive parents that would be lost in our matching
process should gay and lesbian PAPs be restricted from participating.78 As a conservative hypoth-
esis, we assume that whenever we observe a match, the BMO views all applicants as acceptable.
In that case, banning same-sex applicants would reduce the number of matches by the number of
cases in which the child was ultimately adopted and no application by heterosexual parents was
submitted.79;80 This amounts to 6% of matched cases in our data. This is clearly a large effect given
that, according to Table 6, only 18:6% of matched cases allow gay and lesbian PAPs to apply. This
method is an underestimate of the loss of matched children, in that it ignores two important ele-
ments of our environment. First, it ignores the fact that certain heterosexual parents may not appear
acceptable to some birth mothers. Second, it ignores the endogenous effects on PAPs’ threshold
attributes. Indeed, consider our underlying model. Reducing the pool of potential parents would
reduce the competition on the parents’ side and would lead to an increase in the threshold utility
 uPAP: Consequently, fewer applications would be placed, and potentially fewer matches would be
created.
Obviously, this result depends on the participation rate of gay and lesbian PAPs in our match-
ing process, which is not necessarily representative of the overall gay and lesbian participation in
adoption overall. It would be interesting to convert our counterfactual exercise into an estimate of
the number of matches that would have been lost due to a gay and lesbian adoption ban, relative to
a world in which gays and lesbians are universally allowed to adopt (except for restrictions imposed
by the BMOs’ preferences). In order to do that, one would need recent estimates of the gay and les-
bian population and their propensity to adopt. The Census 2000 reported about 600;000 households
headed by a same-sex couple harboring 4% of all adopted children (under the age of 18).81
In our data, same-sex couples are chosen by the BMOs in 12% of all cases of matched babies for
whom we know the identity of the chosen PAP. This serves as an upper bound on the percentage of
matches that would have been lost had same-sex couples been prohibited from participating in the
adoption process.
77She also found that when examining other social costs, such as reduced incarceration or increased education at-
tainment, each dollar spent on the adoption of children from foster care results in $2:45 to $3:26 in tangible beneﬁts to
society.
78In this counterfactual exercise, and in the one in Section 7.2, we study the comparative statics within one equilibrium
of the model presented in Section 4.
79The signiﬁcant variance observed in the number of applications BMOs receive by the time of a match suggests that
they are not determining their duration on the website based on the number of applications received.
80Since the same-sex classiﬁcations are probabilistic, if a child receives an application from n PAPs with probabilities
of being same-sex p1;:::;pn; the probability of all applicants being same-sex couples is
Qn
i=1 pi; which is the probability
at the root of our counterfactual estimation.
81See Badget, Chambers, Gates, and Macomber (2007).
317.2 Foreign Adoptive Parents and the Hague Convention
As discussed in Section 2.3, the ratiﬁcation of the Hague Convention in 2008 has made it difﬁcult
for foreign PAPs to adopt domestically. In our sample, classiﬁcation of PAPs as foreign is only
approximate in that our deductions are based on application behavior alone. Nonetheless, even with
this coarse classiﬁcation, we observe sharp declines in the probability of PAPs being foreign: While
between 2004 and 2009 these probabilities varied between 56:3% and 60:3%; they are estimated at
50:3% in 2008 and at 37:4% in 2009.
The concern regarding the reduction of foreign PAPs is similar to that discussed with respect
to gay and lesbian adoption bans. That is, a reduction of foreign PAPs would potentially lead to a
reduction in the volume of children that ﬁnd an adoptive home.
We perform a similar counterfactual to the one done above. We calculate the expected number of
children that would have remained unmatched in our data had foreign PAPs been prohibited.82 We
ﬁnd that, in expectation, 33% of matches would have been severed had foreign PAPs not participated
in the matching process.
While the precise value of 33% is derived from the way we classify PAPs as foreign, we note
that the qualitative impact is consistent with the preferences we estimate for foreign PAPs. Indeed,
foreign PAPs appear to exhibit more ﬂexibility with respect to baby attributes since they apply
for more children than straight couples do. Therefore, removing them from the matching process
would clearly have a negative effect on matching probabilities. Given that the reduction in foreign
participation may be underestimated in our sample and that the outcomes of such bans are crucial for
policy decisions, a deeper investigation of the consequences of restrictions on international adoption
is an important avenue for future research.
8 Conclusion
We collected a novel data set to track the matching of potential adoptive parents to birth mothers
looking to relinquish their child for adoption. The detailed data on over 800 children allow us to
estimate parents’ preferences over child attributes, most notably over gender, race, time to birth, and
adoption ﬁnalization costs.
We ﬁnd clear patterns in parents’ preferences. First, girls are consistently preferred to boys, and
Caucasians and Hispanics are consistently preferred to African-Americans. In monetary terms, the
increase in desirability of a girl relative to a boy can be compensated by a decrease of approximately
$16;000 in adoption ﬁnalization costs. Similarly, the increase in desirability of a non-African-
American baby with respect to an African-American baby (both of unknown gender) is equivalent
to a decrease of at least $38;000 in adoption ﬁnalization cost. Second, adoption outcomes are some-
what fragile to the timing at which birth mothers enter the process, with adoptive parents preferring
children who are unborn, but relatively close to birth. Third, adoption ﬁnalization costs impact de-
mand signiﬁcantly. An increase in adoption ﬁnalization costs of $10;000 decreases the aggregate
82As before, since the foreign classiﬁcation is probabilistic, if a child receives an application from n PAPs with
corresponding probability of being foreign of p1;:::;pn; the probability of all applicants being foreign is
Qn
i=1 pi.
32probability of receiving an application from 8:6% to 6:8%:
Different categories of adoptive parents—straight, gay, lesbian, single, or foreign—have differ-
ent behaviors in the matching process. We ﬁnd that gays men and lesbian couples submit appli-
cations to 16:5% and 19:3% of children, respectively, while straight couples submit applications to
only 7:2% of babies. However, we do not ﬁnd evidence that same-sex couples or single women are
less biased than straight couples. If anything, they seem to have stronger biases in favor of girls
and against African-American babies. On the other hand, foreign adoptive parents exhibit weaker
gender and racial biases with respect to other parents categories.
The chances that a child put up for adoption will be successfully matched to adoptive parents
depend on several crucial characteristics—namely, how selective the birth mother is regarding the
categories of parents she is willing to consider; the rate at which potential adoptive parents express
interest in adopting the child; and whether the child’s gender is known (presumably, proxying for
medical monitoring such as ultrasound exams). Furthermore, successful matches are associated with
higher estimated adoption ﬁnalization costs.
These observations feed into important policy debates regarding the inclusion of speciﬁc cate-
gories of parents in the adoption process. First, the recent political shifts allowing for more house-
holds comprised of gay and lesbian partners has triggered discussion over the impacts of gay and
lesbian participation on the domestic adoption process. A simple counterfactual experiment banning
same-sex parents from our sample lowers the number of adopted children by about 6%: Therefore,
such a ban could increase the fraction of children in foster care, which has well documented detri-
mental effects.
In a different sphere, the recent ratiﬁcation of the Hague Convention has made international
adoption far more challenging and raised international controversy on the impacts of these new
barriers. Again, a simple counterfactual test banning foreign parents, who are shown to be rather
ﬂexible in terms of preferences over children’s attributes, reveals an estimated 33% decrease in
match probabilities.
While adoption is far-reaching in the U.S. (2:5% of all children are adopted in an industry that
generates 2   3 billion dollars annually), it is still an unexplored territory for economists. In our
context, the domestic adoption process is unique in that it allows us to answer fundamental ques-
tions regarding preferences over race and gender in a situation in which outcomes entail signiﬁcant
commitment. Thus, standard models of search and matching can be used for estimation purposes.
Our study suggests that the adoption industry can be further investigated in several directions.
For example, our results are consistent with adoption agencies carrying an important role in the
setting of ﬁnalization costs and the generation of successful matches between adoptive parents and
birth mothers. In particular, the difference in adoption ﬁnalization costs across genders is difﬁcult
to explain with the mere difference in BMOs’ expenses. This is suggestive of the limited regulation
the adoption industry is subject to. Accounting for particular agencies’ effects would be especially
usefulforunderstandingtheoperationoftheadoptionprocess. Fromaninstitutional-designperspec-
tive, our analysis opens the door for contemplating alternative mechanisms geared at minimizing the
chances that children remain unmatched. For instance, one could consider a more centralized design
in which both adoptive parents and birth mothers submit preferences to a clearinghouse (much as in
several countries throughout the world, such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
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Time from Presentation to Match and to Birth 
Figure 2: Densities of Days from Presentation and Match to Birth
38Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Already Born 0.111 0.315 0 1 619
Number of Interested PAPs 3.158 2.217 1 15 619
Number of Interested Same-Sex PAPs 0.672 1.042 0 9.5 323
Number of Interested Single PAPs 0.362 0.643 0 4 323
PAP Arrival Rate Per Day 0.235 0.37 0.003 4 590
Gender Unknown 0.523 0.500 0 1 618
Girl 0.235 0.424 0 1 618
Boy 0.243 0.429 0 1 618
African-American 0.387 0.404 0 1 619
Caucasian 0.375 0.382 0 1 619
Hispanic 0.143 0.286 0 1 619
Same-Sex PAPs Allowed 0.186 0.39 0 1 323
Single PAPs Allowed 0.588 0.493 0 1 323
Foreign PAPs Allowed 0.87 0.337 0 1 323
Matched on the Website 0.186 0.389 0 1 619
Days on Site 45 67 1 469 590
Days from Presentation to Birth 66 123 -1657 575 583
Table 6: Summary Statistics of BMOs if matched
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PAP
Total Number of PAPs 135 278 149 116 84 82
Foreign PAPs (Score) 0.575 0.563 0.588 0.603 0.503 0.374
Gay PAP (Score) 0.030 0.065 0.067 0.085 0.101 0.089
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.093 0.117 0.100
Gay PAP (Unambiguous) 0.013 0.048 0.048 0.072 0.088 0.078
Lesbian PAP (Unambiguous) 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.079 0.103 0.089
Single PAP 0.179 0.127 0.114 0.083 0.193 0.154
BABY
Number of Babies 139 239 141 129 117 126
Same-Sex PAP Allowed 0.302 0.180 0.156 0.736 0.333 0.333
Single PAP Allowed 0.784 0.644 0.518 0.868 0.598 0.643
Foreign PAP Allowed 0.892 0.891 0.887 0.968 0.782 0.651
African-American 0.447 0.460 0.370 0.329 0.350 0.329
Girl 0.302 0.205 0.234 0.0698 0.231 0.254
Boy 0.252 0.378 0.376 0.0923 0.393 0.333
Months to Birth 0.621 0.755 1.22 0.128 0.414 2.41
Finalization Cost 20522 22834 26543 27081 31076 31780
Table 7: Trends from 2004 to 2009
39Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP Foreign
PAP Applies for Baby (Score) (Scorey) (Scorey) (Scorey)
Activity Window: 90 Days
Already Born (d) -0.009 -0.013* -0.062 -0.052 0.027 -0.016*
(-1.80) (-2.46) (-1.67) (-0.88) (1.08) (-2.21)
Months to Birth -0.001** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(-2.85) (-2.75) (-1.17) (-0.37) (-1.06) (-2.06)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.019 -0.075** -0.018* -0.019***
(-5.83) (-5.04) (-1.04) (-2.66) (-2.50) (-5.90)
African-American Girl -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.147** -0.144* -0.039* -0.030***
(-6.12) (-5.04) (-2.75) (-2.47) (-2.17) (-3.49)
African-American Boy -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.048 -0.070 -0.057** -0.046***
(-7.47) (-6.68) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-2.59) (-4.96)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.053*** -0.051*** -0.077 -0.071 -0.054*** -0.048***
(-8.07) (-7.13) (-1.39) (-1.30) (-3.51) (-5.49)
Non-African-American Girl 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.111 0.187** 0.023 0.019*
(4.29) (3.57) (1.78) (2.64) (1.33) (2.45)
Non-African-American Boy -0.005 -0.007 0.008 0.085 0.003 0.002
(-1.06) (-1.33) (0.18) (1.79) (0.16) (0.26)
Hispanic 0.002 0.003 0.071 -0.013 -0.016 0.004
(0.26) (0.47) (1.14) (-0.15) (-0.79) (0.45)
Year 2004 (d) -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.031 -0.114** -0.002 -0.036***
(-7.27) (-4.98) (-0.67) (-3.07) (-0.11) (-5.47)
Year 2005 (d) -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.052 -0.083* -0.012 -0.032***
(-6.20) (-3.35) (-1.31) (-2.16) (-0.72) (-4.18)
Year 2006 (d) -0.020*** -0.007 0.063 -0.068 -0.030* -0.016*
(-4.40) (-1.29) (0.95) (-1.50) (-2.24) (-2.08)
Year 2007 (d) -0.026*** -0.013* 0.005 -0.179*** -0.007 -0.021**
(-6.36) (-2.44) (0.11) (-7.53) (-0.30) (-3.05)
Year 2008 (d) -0.003 0.003 -0.013 0.016 0.034 0.003
(-0.72) (0.52) (-0.48) (0.49) (1.81) (0.44)
Gay PAP (Score) 0.050***
(5.27)
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.075***
(8.09)
Single PAP (Score) 0.001
(0.10)
Foreign PAP (Score) 0.058***
(7.30)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.066 0.052 0.126 0.158 0.0572 0.068
Probability for Base Case ~ 0.060 0.093 0.153 0.255 0.086 0.118
2 385.90 148.51 30.36 63.20 42.60 105.94
Log-Likelihood -224071.1 -185977.4 -28673.5 -32214.2 -26979.0 -229591.9
Observations 1088210 944423 80828 74422 125246 969035
PAP-Babies 33403 29277 2698 2440 3484 31245
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p <
0:001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ~ Note that the omitted category is a gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn
child, less than one month to birth, with ﬁnalization cost of $26,000 in 2009. y: Gay, lesbian, and foreign estimated using weighted probit.
Table 8: Determinants of PAPs Applications (Activity Window of 90 Days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
40Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP Foreign PAP
PAP Applies for Baby (Score) (Scorey) (Scorey) (Scorey)
| Application at Some Point in Time
Already Born (d) -0.006 -0.008* -0.028 0.029 0.021 -0.010
(-1.40) (-1.98) (-0.79) (0.49) (1.11) (-1.70)
Months to Birth -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.12) (-1.14) (0.03) (0.98) (-0.91) (-0.64)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.012*** -0.011*** 0.008 -0.029 -0.016* -0.015***
(-6.55) (-5.91) (0.45) (-1.24) (-2.45) (-6.28)
African-American Girl -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.134** -0.119* -0.059*** -0.029***
(-6.88) (-5.47) (-2.77) (-2.16) (-3.65) (-4.29)
African-American Boy -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.068 -0.096 -0.071*** -0.049***
(-9.86) (-8.81) (-1.63) (-1.85) (-3.76) (-7.08)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.119*** -0.039 -0.039** -0.040***
(-9.46) (-8.55) (-3.62) (-0.94) (-2.73) (-6.65)
Non-African-American Girl 0.016*** 0.013** -0.053 0.033 0.037* 0.010
(3.71) (3.06) (-0.94) (0.50) (2.26) (1.72)
Non-African-American Boy -0.011** -0.011** -0.062 0.060 -0.025 -0.005
(-2.77) (-2.64) (-1.62) (1.33) (-1.68) (-0.94)
Hispanic -0.005 -0.001 0.072 -0.052 -0.043* -0.005
(-1.20) (-0.31) (1.27) (-0.73) (-2.26) (-0.93)
Year 2004 (d) -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.036 -0.109** -0.017 -0.026***
(-9.92) (-6.84) (-1.02) (-3.09) (-1.03) (-4.68)
Year 2005 (d) -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.017 -0.054 -0.009 -0.017**
(-7.09) (-4.32) (-0.41) (-1.25) (-0.60) (-2.76)
Year 2006 (d) -0.022*** -0.012** 0.164* -0.099** -0.041*** -0.011
(-6.54) (-2.99) (1.99) (-2.76) (-3.74) (-1.69)
Year 2007 (d) -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.048 -0.160*** -0.027 -0.024***
(-9.28) (-4.27) (-1.26) (-7.27) (-1.50) (-3.65)
Year 2008 (d) 0.012* 0.019** 0.043 -0.002 0.030 0.039***
(2.26) (3.24) (1.05) (-0.05) (1.37) (3.95)
Gay PAP (Score) 0.044***
(5.78)
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.062***
(9.71)
Single PAP (Score) 0.010*
(2.40)
Foreign PAP (Score) 0.058***
(9.16)
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.060 0.048 0.126 0.153 0.061 0.062
Probability for Base Case ~ 0.056 0.088 0.164 0.260 0.109 0.095
2 624.32 264.07 53.36 36.77 39.19 199.20
Log-Likelihood -5987.7 -4974.9 -703.9 -822.5 -695.3 -6163.1
PAP-Babies 30457 26679 2162 1963 3183 27913
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ~
Note that the omitted category is gender unknown, non-African-American, unborn child who is less than one month to birth, with ﬁnalization cost
of $26,000 in 2009.y: Gay, lesbian and foreign estimated using weighted probit. | PAP submits an application at some point when the BMO is
available on the website. Activity window of 90 days.
Table 9: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Application at Some Point in Time) – Marginal
Effects for Probit
41Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Lesbian PAP Single PAP Foreign
PAP Applies for Baby (Score) (Scorey) (Scorey) (Scorey)
Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.013 -0.018** -0.045 -0.053 0.024 -0.022*
(-1.88) (-2.71) (-0.81) (-0.68) (0.74) (-2.39)
1 Month Before Birth (d) -0.000 -0.002 0.043 0.001 0.003 -0.002
(-0.07) (-0.59) (1.09) (0.03) (0.25) (-0.70)
2 Month Before Birth (d) 0.000 -0.001 0.059 0.004 -0.009 -0.002
(0.08) (-0.33) (1.42) (0.09) (-0.74) (-0.45)
3 Month Before Birth (d) -0.006 -0.007 0.056 -0.007 -0.017 -0.010
(-1.49) (-1.79) (1.22) (-0.16) (-1.32) (-1.84)
4 Month Before Birth (d) -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.048 -0.060 -0.020 -0.021***
(-3.89) (-3.57) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.42) (-3.98)
5 Month Before Birth (d) -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.066 -0.083 -0.022 -0.028***
(-5.60) (-5.27) (-1.88) (-1.89) (-1.45) (-4.74)
6 Month Before Birth (d) -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.061 -0.115** -0.020 -0.033***
(-5.43) (-5.01) (-1.33) (-2.91) (-1.07) (-4.52)
7 Month Before Birth (d) -0.045*** -0.045*** 0.067 -0.155*** -0.054*** -0.062***
(-7.83) (-7.75) (0.63) (-3.55) (-4.15) (-10.90)
8 Month Before Birth (d) -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.014 -0.196*** -0.066*** -0.069***
(-7.46) (-6.07) (-0.11) (-9.39) (-8.65) (-9.83)
Month After Birth -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.001
(-0.65) (-1.60) (-0.60) (-1.58) (0.45) (-0.94)
Finalization Cost in 10 000’s of $ -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017 -0.090** -0.022* -0.026***
(-6.37) (-5.58) (-0.76) (-2.61) (-2.34) (-6.54)
African-American Girl -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.205** -0.245*** -0.065** -0.054***
(-7.54) (-6.12) (-3.20) (-3.34) (-2.68) (-4.78)
African-American Boy -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.065 -0.151 -0.087** -0.075***
(-8.99) (-7.98) (-1.13) (-1.77) (-3.13) (-6.40)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.079*** -0.075*** -0.113 -0.144* -0.081*** -0.073***
(-9.28) (-8.14) (-1.69) (-2.20) (-3.88) (-6.57)
Non-African-American Girl 0.019** 0.016* 0.076 0.169 0.023 0.014
(2.79) (2.23) (0.98) (1.89) (0.97) (1.41)
Non-African-American Boy -0.015* -0.017* -0.014 0.058 -0.007 -0.007
(-2.34) (-2.47) (-0.26) (0.94) (-0.34) (-0.83)
Hispanic -0.003 -0.001 0.088 -0.081 -0.029 -0.002
(-0.45) (-0.12) (1.16) (-0.72) (-1.12) (-0.20)
Gay PAP (Score) 0.059***
(4.70)




Foreign PAP (Score) 0.076***
(7.26)
Years (d) X X X X X X
Probability for Mean Attributes 0.086 0.072 0.161 0.194 0.080 0.092
Probability for Base Case ~ 0.092 0.143 0.182 0.357 0.121 0.188
2 462.43 256.42 65.40 73.67 65.67 210.93
Log-Likelihood -206421.9 -171588.1 -26844.0 -29869.6 -25557.9 -210405.7
Observations 825982 715179 67210 61560 97418 742059
PAP-Babies 29364 25746 2416 2161 3164 27431
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Standard
Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ~ Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American
unborn child with ﬁnalization cost of 26 000 dollars in 2009 who is less than one month from birth.y: Gay, lesbian,
and foreign estimated using weighted probit, with weights corresponding to probability that PAP is gay, lesbian or
foreign respectively.
Table 10: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Activity Window of 10 days) – Marginal Effects for
Probit
42Dependent Variable: All Straight PAP Gay PAP Single Lesbian PAP Foreign PAPy
PAP Applies for Baby (Unambiguous) (Unambiguous) PAP (Unambiguous) (Score)
 Activity Window: 10 Days
Already Born (d) -0.014* -0.017* -0.064 0.029 -0.054 -0.025**
(-2.07) (-2.20) (-1.02) (0.95) (-0.58) (-2.66)
Months to Birth -0.001** -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001*
(-3.05) (-2.44) (-0.13) (-1.03) (-0.17) (-2.50)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.005 -0.017 -0.096* -0.024***
(-5.61) (-4.59) (-0.16) (-1.73) (-2.26) (-5.89)
African-American Girl -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.210** -0.051* -0.208* -0.039***
(-6.13) (-4.84) (-2.58) (-2.14) (-2.49) (-3.51)
African-American Boy -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.014 -0.073** -0.084 -0.062***
(-7.19) (-6.02) (-0.19) (-2.59) (-0.87) (-5.19)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.100 -0.079*** -0.096 -0.061***
(-8.04) (-6.94) (-1.10) (-3.71) (-1.21) (-5.50)
Non-African-American Girl 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.138 0.034 0.258* 0.025*
(4.45) (3.84) (1.41) (1.44) (2.43) (2.49)
Non-African-American Boy -0.004 -0.008 0.009 0.004 0.134 0.003
(-0.65) (-1.08) (0.13) (0.17) (1.89) (0.34)
Hispanic 0.006 0.002 0.146 -0.028 -0.022 0.005
(0.84) (0.28) (1.53) (-1.08) (-0.17) (0.48)
Year 2004 (d) -0.042*** -0.032*** 0.023 0.022 -0.049 -0.052***
(-7.87) (-4.88) (0.21) (0.80) (-0.61) (-6.37)
Year 2005 (d) -0.036*** -0.020** -0.048 0.003 -0.051 -0.043***
(-5.80) (-2.72) (-0.69) (0.14) (-0.74) (-4.36)
Year 2006 (d) -0.014* 0.014 0.144 0.018 -0.071 -0.006
(-2.12) (1.48) (1.36) (0.48) (-1.03) (-0.57)
Year 2007 (d) -0.025*** -0.003 0.037 0.035 -0.217*** -0.022*
(-4.06) (-0.29) (0.54) (0.70) (-6.12) (-2.27)
Year 2008 (d) 0.014* 0.026** -0.008 0.026 0.065 0.026*
(2.01) (2.58) (-0.16) (1.02) (1.30) (2.32)
Unambiguous Gay PAP (d) 0.090***
(3.92)
Unambiguous Lesbian PAP (d) 0.156***
(5.74)




Probability for Mean Attributes 0.086 0.072 0.189 0.076 0.223 0.091
Probability for Base Case ~ 0.069 0.111 0.168 0.088 0.271 0.151
2 415.98 173.91 27.80 40.67 50.18 148.01
Log-Likelihood -214635.4 -141391.0 -5754.8 -20389.0 -8600.3 -208980.9
Observations 864727 588064 13583 79448 16939 734659
PAP-Babies 30664 21452 499 2512 583 27128
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. Standard Errors Clustered by PAP-Baby Pair. ~ Note that the
omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American unborn child with ﬁnalization cost of $26,000 in 2009. y: Foreign estimated using weighted probit.
Table 11: Determinants of PAPs’ Applications (Activity Window of 10 days) – Unambiguous Gay
and Lesbian Couples
43Dependent Variable Same-Sex PAPs Foreign PAPs Single PAPs
Allowed Allowed Allowed
Already Born 0.090 -0.087* 0.075
(1.71) (-2.16) (1.29)
Months to Birth -0.001 -0.004 0.000
(-0.38) (-0.94) (0.06)
Finalization Cost in $10,000s -0.020*** 0.000 -0.007*
(-6.77) (0.11) (-2.36)
African-American Girl -0.043 0.052 0.212*
(-0.57) (0.88) (2.42)
African-American Boy -0.133 0.016 0.112
(-1.82) (0.28) (1.46)
African-American Unknown Gender -0.002 0.019 0.147*
(-0.03) (0.37) (2.01)
Non-African-American Girl -0.088 -0.044 -0.076
(-1.24) (-0.94) (-1.12)
Non-African-American Boy -0.077 0.006 -0.008
(-1.25) (0.14) (-0.14)
Hispanic -0.085 0.075 0.026
(-1.10) (1.34) (0.36)
Year 2004 (d) -0.187*** 0.121*** 0.094
(-4.13) (4.63) (1.42)
Year 2005 (d) -0.303*** 0.157*** -0.028
(-7.73) (5.66) (-0.43)
Year 2006 (d) -0.230*** 0.133*** -0.204**
(-6.21) (5.93) (-2.81)
Year 2007 (d) 0.166* 0.179*** 0.175**
(2.02) (9.63) (2.86)
Year 2008 (d) -0.038 0.089** -0.017
(-0.64) (3.27) (-0.26)
Probability for Mean Attributes~ 0.280 0.868 0.672
2 142.38 63.20 76.06
Log-Likelihood -341.8 -266.6 -399.0
Babies 683 683 683
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001. ~ Note that the omitted category is gender unknown non-African-American unborn
child with ﬁnalization cost of $26,000 in 2009.
Table 12: Determinants of Restrictions: Marginal Effects for Probit
44Dependent Variable: Chosen PAP I II III IV
Same-Sex PAP (Score) 0.09
(0.94)
Single PAP (Score) (d) -0.08 -0.08 -0.27
(-0.64) (-0.69) (-1.71)
Gay PAP (Score) -0.04 -0.23
(-0.32) (-1.41)
Lesbian PAP (Score) 0.24 0.29
(1.55) (1.53)
Foreign Score -0.06 -0.03
(-0.41) (-0.15)
Baseline 0.507 0.506 0.427 0.484
2 1.41 3.91 5.13 0.02
Log-Likelihood -144.9 -143.6 -90.7 -95.0
Observations 517 517 323 329
p < 0:05; p < 0:01; p < 0:001
Table 13: Marginal Effect (at Fixed Effect=0) of Multinomial Logit of Chosen PAP.
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